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D A V I D  A .  S K E E L ,  J R .  
Distorted Choice in Corporate Bankruptcy 
abstract.  We ordinarily assume that a central objective of every voting process is ensuring 
an undistorted vote. Recent developments in corporate bankruptcy, which culminates with an 
elaborate vote, are quite puzzling from this perspective. Two strategies now routinely used in big 
cases are intended to distort, and clearly do distort, the voting process. Restructuring support 
agreements (RSAs) and “deathtrap” provisions remove creditors’ ability to vote for or against a 
proposed reorganization simply on the merits. 
 This Article offers the first comprehensive analysis of these new distortive techniques. One 
possible solution is simply to ban distortive techniques, as several scholars advocate with RSAs 
that offer joinder bonuses. Although an antidistortion rule would be straightforward to imple-
ment, I argue this would be a mistake. The distortive techniques respond to developments that 
have made reorganization difficult, such as claims trading and a greater need for speed. Further, 
Chapter 11’s baseline was never intended to be neutral: it nudges the parties toward confirming a 
reorganization plan. There also are independent justifications for some distortive techniques, and 
the alternative to using them might be even worse—possibly leading to more fire sales of debt-
ors’ assets. 
 How can legitimate use of the new distortive techniques be distinguished from more perni-
cious practices? To answer this question, I outline four rules of thumb to assist the scrutiny. 
Courts should consider whether holdouts are a serious threat, the magnitude of the coercion, the 
significance of any independent justifications, and whether the holdout threat is an intentional 
feature of the parties’ contracts. I then apply the rules of thumb to a few prominent recent cases. 
I conclude by considering two obvious extensions of the analysis, so-called “gi�ing” transactions 
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introduction 
We ordinarily assume—or at least pretend to assume—that a central objec-
tive of every voting process is ensuring an undistorted vote. Protecting the in-
tegrity of a vote is sometimes difficult, and the best way to achieve this may be 
contested, as reflected in the controversies over the Supreme Court’s voting-
rights jurisprudence and in debates over possible foreign interference in the last 
presidential election.1 But nearly everyone agrees that the goal should be to 
remove distortions so that voters can resolve the question at hand on the mer-
its. 
Recent developments in corporate bankruptcy are quite puzzling from this 
perspective. Chapter 11 is organized around an elaborate vote. The debtor or 
other proponent of a reorganization plan divides the creditors and shareholders 
of the company into different classes,2 and the creditors or shareholders in each 
class vote to approve or reject the proposed plan.3 If every class of creditors and 
shareholders votes in favor of the proposed plan, and it satisfies a number of 
other requirements, the bankruptcy judge will confirm the plan.4 Bankruptcy 
law gives the bankruptcy judge ample tools to police any distortions. Voting 
cannot begin until the court approves a disclosure statement giving the credi-
tors and shareholders “adequate information” about the proposed plan,5 for in-
stance, and the judge can disqualify problematic votes.6 The law on the books 
is intended to produce a simple undistorted vote. 
Yet the law as it plays out in practice looks radically different. Two of the 
most important developments in recent bankruptcy practice are intended to 
distort, and clearly do distort, the voting process. They remove creditors’ abil-
ity to vote simply on the merits—that is, to vote based on the plan’s proposed 
payout for their class. 
 
1. See, e.g., Tim Fernholz, No One Is Protecting the 2020 Election, QUARTZ (Nov. 23, 2019), 
https://qz.com/1754314/no-one-is-protecting-the-2020-election [https://perma.cc/PVM6-
9LLT]; Michael Wines, Protection of Voting Rights for Minorities Has Fallen Sharply, a New 
Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/12/us/voting-
rights-minorities.html [https://perma.cc/HNY7-T3WW] (describing the controversy over 
the effect of the Supreme Court decision to strike down parts of the Voting Rights Act). 
2. 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (2018) (governing the classification of claims or interests). 
3. A class of creditors approves the plan if two thirds in amount and a majority in number of 
the claims in the class cast a ballot vote “yes.” 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2018). 
4. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (2018). If some but not all classes vote “yes,” the plan can sometimes be 
approved through a “cramdown” process. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2018). 
5. 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2018). 
6. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (2018). 
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The first is the emergence of restructuring support agreements (RSAs).7 In 
the simplest type of RSA, the debtor negotiates the terms of a potential reor-
ganization plan with a subset of its creditors—o�en focusing on multiple clas-
ses of creditors but sometimes targeting a single class. The RSA commits its 
signatories to support a future reorganization plan that conforms to the terms 
of the RSA, including the proposed payout to each creditor class. A creditor 
that signs the RSA relinquishes its ability to decide independently whether to 
support a reorganization plan subsequently proposed by the debtor. It does this 
before—o�en long before—a disclosure statement is approved and the pro-
posed reorganization is submitted to creditors for a vote. 
Many recent RSAs further distort the decisionmaking process by offering to 
pay a “support fee” to creditors who sign the RSA. Such “signing-fee RSAs” 
offer compensation that may reimburse creditors for the professional fees they 
incurred while negotiating the RSA. A signing-fee RSA may also include a fee 
for supporting the reorganization plan when it is proposed and waiving the 
right to object, as in agreements involving Puerto Rico’s electricity company 
and Peabody Energy.8 
Alternatively, the RSA may provide a benefit to signatories, such as the 
right to provide debtor-in-possession financing during the case or to partici-
pate in a rights offering a�er the debtor’s reorganization plan is confirmed.9 
These inducements, which are available only to those who sign the RSA, look 
like a form of vote buying, since they compensate signatories who commit to 
supporting an upcoming plan. 
The second recent development is the use of “deathtrap” provisions in pro-
posed reorganization plans. In a traditional deathtrap provision, the debtor 
proposes to give a creditor class some form of compensation if it votes “yes,” 
but cuts it off altogether if it votes “no.” The reorganization plan in the Trident 
Holding Company bankruptcy said, for instance, that if the first lien classes 
and the second lien classes “are Accepting Classes, each Holder of an Allowed 
Second Lien Claim shall receive its Pro Rata share and interest in 1% of the 
Warrants,” but if the First Lien Classes or the Second Lien Classes “are not Ac-
 
7. RSAs are sometimes called Plan Support Agreements, or PSAs. The term RSA is typically 
used when the agreement is negotiated before bankruptcy, whereas PSA is usually used 
when the agreement is negotiated a�er the filing. 
8. For a detailed discussion of the Puerto Rico electricity company and Peabody Energy agree-
ments, see infra Part IV. 
9. Rights offerings give creditors the right to buy equity in the reorganized company at a set 
price. For an overview of the use of rights offerings in bankruptcy, see Jay M. Goffman & 
George Howard, Rights Offerings Prove Popular with Both Debtors, Distressed Investors: Billions 
Raised in Recent Offerings for Companies, J. CORP. RENEWAL, Jan.-Feb. 2018, at 4-8. 
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cepting Classes, Holders of Allowed Second Lien Claims shall not receive any 
distributions on account of such Allowed Second Lien Claims.”10 
A more elaborate version—the “individually targeted deathtrap”—may offer 
one form of compensation to individual creditors who vote “yes” and a differ-
ent compensation to individual creditors who vote “no.”11 In each case, the 
point is to apply pressure, using both a carrot (the compensation for a “yes” 
vote) and a stick (worse treatment of “no” votes) to nudge the creditors or 
shareholders to vote in favor of the plan.12 
RSAs and deathtraps can distort the voting process in at least three ways.13 
First, if they include supplemental payments, the additional compensation 
pressures creditors to vote for the reorganization plan even if creditors believe 
the payout is too low. These payments require a creditor to forgo compensation 
if she or the class votes “no,” and thus make a “no” vote more expensive and 
less attractive for reasons unrelated to the creditor’s views on the underlying 
merits of the plan. Second, distortive techniques can procedurally warp the vot-
ing process by binding creditors before the plan has been formally proposed 
and using exploding offers to induce creditors to commit early on. Third, RSAs 
and deathtraps may even distort the voting process by decreasing creditors’ 
likelihood of success in challenging the plan in the event the class of creditors 
votes “no.”14 By making the alternative to voting “yes” less attractive, these 
techniques can coerce creditors to vote for the plan.15 
 
10. Joint Plan of Reorganization of Trident Holding Company, LLC and Its Debtor Affiliates at 
26, In re Trident Holding Co., LLC, No. 19-10384 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2019). 
11. Under the Arch Coal, Inc. reorganization plan, for instance, if a class of “unsecured funded 
debt” claims voted “yes,” they would receive a specified distribution. If the class voted “no,” 
claimants that had signed the RSA or did not opt out of the plan’s third-party releases would 
receive the distribution, but claimants who voted “no” would not. Debtors’ Third Amended 
Joint Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code at 31-32, In re Arch 
Coal, Inc., No. 16-40120-705 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. July 6, 2016). 
12. In philosophy, the combination of a threat and a benefit has been dubbed a “throffer.” Hillel 
Steiner, Individual Liberty, 75 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 33, 39 (1974). 
13. Here and throughout the Article, I use the term “distortion” broadly, to encompass any 
strategy that creates incentives for a creditor to support a plan that the creditor might not 
support if she were voting simply on the merits. 
14. See infra text accompanying notes 88-89. 
15. This Article is primarily concerned with distortions that are created by the RSA itself.  
Debtor-in-possession financing agreements that give senior lenders control of the restruc-
turing process are sometimes accompanied by RSAs with the senior lenders. See, e.g., Ken-
neth Ayotte & Jared A. Ellias, Bankruptcy Process for Sale 2 (May 26, 2020) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing the control of the lenders in the Neiman Mar-
cus and J. Crew bankruptcies). In this context, senior lenders are taking advantage of the 
leverage they have as the source of essential financing. 
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Despite the ubiquity of the new distortive techniques, they are just begin-
ning to attract attention in the scholarly literature. Several scholars have writ-
ten about RSAs,16 but I am not aware of any articles that devote meaningful at-
tention to the use of deathtrap provisions or to the increase in voting 
distortions more generally. This Article is the first to attempt a more compre-
hensive analysis of the new landscape of distorted voting. 
One obvious solution to bankruptcy’s voting distortions might be to pro-
hibit or sharply restrict their use. This is the usual strategy elsewhere, and in 
corporate law, Delaware courts have in fact banned a somewhat analogous dis-
tortion that featured in freeze-out mergers.17 In the past, a corporate parent 
could use subtle forms of coercion when freezing out the minority shares of a 
subsidiary. If the parent made a tender offer for the minority shares, for in-
stance, it could hint that any untendered shares would be neglected a�er the 
tender offer,18 thus diminishing the value of untendered shares. Delaware 
courts have cracked down on these practices by imposing a stringent anti-
distortion rule.19 
The same approach could easily be employed in Chapter 11. In its strong 
form, an antidistortion rule would ban the use of RSAs and deathtrap provi-
sions altogether, since each distorts the voting process. Under a weaker anti-
distortion rule, courts might prohibit only the variations of RSAs and death-
traps that introduce the most significant distortions, such as signing-fee RSAs 
and individually targeted deathtraps. 
The antidistortion approach has considerable appeal, especially for those of 
us who already are attracted to rule-of-law moralism. It would ensure a much 
more unbiased Chapter 11 vote than the vote in most current reorganization 
cases, while also reducing the risk of windfalls to favored creditors. It also 
 
16. Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Quiet Revolution, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 593 (2017); Edward J. 
Janger & Adam J. Levitin, Badges of Opportunism: Principles for Policing Restructuring Support 
Agreements, 13 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. & COM. L. 169 (2018). 
17. In a typical freeze-out merger, a controlling shareholder (o�en the parent corporation) uses 
a merger to force minority shareholders to take cash for their shares, leaving the controlling 
shareholder with 100% of the company. The key case constraining the freeze-out strategy 
described in the text that follows is In re Pure Resources, Inc., Shareholders Litigation, 808 A.2d 
421 (Del. Ch. 2002), which is discussed at the outset of Part II. 
18. If the controller explicitly said that it planned to delist the shares, the tender offer might 
have been enjoined as impermissibly coercive. See In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 
A.2d at 438 n.26. But the controller probably could have gotten away with a vaguer threat. 
19. Lucian Bebchuk has advocated an antidistortion rule that would go even further and would 
attempt to remove even minor distortive effects from all tender offers. Lucian Bebchuk, To-
ward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 
1747-52 (1985). 
distorted choice in corporate bankruptcy 
373 
would be relatively simple to implement. As already noted, existing bankruptcy 
law gives judges powerful tools to curb voting distortions. Before the debtor 
can solicit votes on a proposed reorganization plan during the case, for in-
stance, the bankruptcy court must find that the disclosure statement provides 
“adequate information” to creditors.20 A court could easily hold that an RSA 
violates this provision—and on rare occasions, courts have done precisely 
this.21 RSAs and deathtrap provisions also could be struck down as incon-
sistent with the obligation that the plan be “proposed in good faith and not by 
any means forbidden by law.”22 If antidistortion is the best solution, it lies 
readily at hand. 
The first clue that banning the new distortive techniques may not be the 
optimal solution comes from the response of the bankruptcy courts. With only 
a few exceptions, most of them in the early 2000s, bankruptcy judges have up-
held both RSAs and deathtrap provisions. To be sure, bankruptcy judges’ en-
dorsement does not necessarily mean there is no reason to worry about the dis-
tortive techniques. It is possible that judges have not yet fully recognized the 
distortive effects of the new techniques, or that bankruptcy judges are too quick 
to approve the use of provisions that make successful reorganization more like-
ly. But courts’ acquiescence to the new distortive techniques suggests these 
strategies may be more justified than they initially appear. 
It turns out they are. The justification for permitting at least some use of 
these distortive techniques begins to emerge if we take a closer look at the envi-
ronment in which the new distortive techniques emerged. In the early years of 
Chapter 11, large debtors had the option of devising reorganization plans at a 
leisurely pace—they had a long “runway,” in current jargon.23 This is no longer 
the case. Financial distress must now be resolved much more quickly, both be-
cause the value of many troubled companies is evanescent and because lenders 
and other creditors use debtors’ need for liquidity as leverage to compress the 
 
20. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (2018). 
21. Delaware bankruptcy courts appear to have invalidated early RSAs on this ground in two 
2002 decisions—In re Stations Holding Co., No. 02-10882 (MFW), 2002 WL 31947022, at *3 
(Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 30, 2002), and In re NII Holdings, Inc., 288 B.R. 356, 362 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2002)—but these cases were dismissed as having little precedential or persuasive power 
in a subsequent decision, In re Indianapolis Downs, LLC., 486 B.R. 286, 295 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2013). 
22. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2018). 
23. The length of many early cases was seen as a major problem with Chapter 11. See Lynn M. 
LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 729, 731. 
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timeline of the case.24 Whereas the typical Chapter 11 case lasted more than 
two years prior to 2000,25 the duration is now roughly one year.26 
Achieving a speedy reorganization would be challenging even if the debtor 
were dealing with a stable group of creditors. But because claims trading is 
now ubiquitous, creditors’ interests are highly unstable.27 A potential deal 
hammered out today may fall apart tomorrow a�er some claims are sold to 
buyers who do not believe the proposed deal is a good one. 
It also is easier than ever before for a distressed-debt investor to assemble a 
blocking position and thereby veto the debtor’s proposed reorganization plan.28 
The explosion of claims trading appears to have begun roughly a decade a�er 
the current bankruptcy laws were adopted,29 and the market for distressed debt 
has grown exponentially since then.30 
The ease with which distressed-debt traders can now acquire veto power 
can be both helpful and harmful. If the debtor proposes a problematic reorgan-
ization plan, a creditor’s efforts to block the plan may benefit other creditors as 
 
24. Compare Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
751, 765-66 (2002) (discussing how firms are increasingly comprised of intangible assets), 
and id. at 784 (“The control that the lender has over cash collateral makes it hard to enter in-
to a financing arrangement without its explicit blessing.”), with LoPucki, supra note 23, at 
739-45 (criticizing the previous length of bankruptcy cases). 
25. See, e.g., Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch & Ning Zhu, The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation 
Versus Chapter 11 Reorganization, 61 J. FIN. 1253, 1270 (2006) (finding an average duration of 
2.3 years for Chapter 11 cases filed between 1995 and 2001). 
26. See Foteini Teloni, Chapter 11 Duration, Pre-Planned Cases, and Refiling Rates: An Empirical 
Analysis in the Post-BAPCPA Era, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 571, 592-93 (2015) (finding 
that the mean duration for traditional Chapter 11 cases dropped from 634 to 430 days a�er 
2005, and the mean for all cases (including prepackaged bankruptcies) fell from 480 to 261 
days a�er 2005). 
27. The first scholar to call attention to this effect of claims trading was Fred Tung. Frederick 
Tung, Confirmation and Claims Trading, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1684 (1996). For evidence that 
there is less turnover than is sometimes thought, see Jared A. Ellias, Bankruptcy Claims Trad-
ing, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 772, 782-83 (2018). 
28. A distressed-debt trader who acquires one third of the value of the claims in a class can block 
approval, since approval requires two thirds. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2018). 
29. The dramatic increase in claims trading began in the late 1980s and early 1990s. See, e.g., 
Michelle M. Harner, The Corporate Governance and Public Policy Implications of Activist Dis-
tressed Debt Investing, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 710 n.22 (2008) (“The practice of buying 
distressed debt . . . morphed into a more sophisticated and activist investment practice with 
the stock failure of 1987 and the corporate failures that followed.”). 
30. Estimates of the size of the distressed-debt market vary widely, in part due to differing defi-
nitions of distressed debt. According to one, “[a]s of June 30, 2019, the total face value of 
distressed and defaulted debt . . . [was] $773 billion.” Edward I. Altman & Robert Benhenni, 
The Anatomy of Distressed Debt Markets, 11 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 21, 23 (2019). 
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well. But the veto facilitated by claims trading may also enable a creditor who 
has a conflict of interest—such as a competitor of the debtor—or other perverse 
incentive to thwart confirmation of a reorganization plan that serves the inter-
ests of the debtor and other creditors. Moreover, even if a creditor does not 
have problematic incentives, it may seek to use its leverage to obtain a dispro-
portionate recovery for itself.31 Given that distressed-debt traders o�en have a 
short-term focus and little reputational stake in the consequences of their in-
tervention, the potential for problematic holdouts is significant. 
Of course, the emergence of new obstacles to a successful reorganization 
does not justify voting distortions by itself. All else equal, the appropriate re-
sponse might be something along the lines of “tough luck.” But all else is not 
equal in bankruptcy. Perhaps surprisingly for those who assume votes should 
be undistorted, the Chapter 11 vote is not intended to be neutral and unco-
erced. The voting rules already include features that are designed to nudge the 
parties toward confirmation of a reorganization plan. If one or more classes 
vote against a proposed reorganization plan, for instance, the plan can never-
theless be “crammed down” if, among other things, the proposed plan “does 
not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable.”32 There also is an implicit 
threat that, if the parties fail to devise a confirmable reorganization plan, the 
case will be converted to Chapter 7, and the debtor’s assets will be sold off in 
pieces by a court-appointed trustee.33 
If the goal is to tilt the playing field slightly toward reorganization, and re-
cent developments have made reorganization more difficult, distortive tech-
niques that so�en the effects of these developments might not be inherently 
bad. Distortive techniques may sometimes be appropriate to counteract de-
structive holdout activity.34 
There also are independent justifications for some distortive techniques. 
The signing-fee RSA, for instance—which some commentators treat as per se 
 
31. For a similar typology of holdout behavior, see William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, The 
New Bond Workouts, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1597, 1607 (2018). In addition to holdout creditors 
who vote strategically because they have a conflict of interest or seek to obtain an extra pay-
off for themselves, Bratton and Levitin include creditors who vote sincerely but misjudge the 
benefits of the proposed transaction. 
32. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2018). 
33. 11 U.S.C. § 1112 (2018) (governing conversion or dismissal). 
34. Janger and Levitin have similar concerns and advocate that claims traders’ voting rights be 
limited to the amount they paid for the claim. Edward J. Janger & Adam J. Levitin, One Dol-
lar, One Vote: Mark-to-Market Governance in Bankruptcy, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1857, 1858 (2019). 
Although I am not persuaded that distressed-debt investors should automatically be disen-
franchised in this way, I do favor giving debtors some ability to discipline holdouts. 
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disqualifying35—may compensate the signatories for the cost of negotiating a 
plan that benefits all creditors and for committing themselves and any succes-
sors to support the proposed reorganization plan even if a better alternative 
emerges. A deathtrap provision may resolve—or at least postpone until a�er 
confirmation—a high-stakes dispute that could otherwise derail the reorganiza-
tion process by consuming the debtor in time-consuming litigation.36 To be 
sure, the purported benefits of a distortive technique may be exaggerated or 
outweighed by the potentially pernicious effects of the technique. But there 
o�en are legitimate justifications for using a technique even if it incidentally 
distorts the voting process. In this sense, the new distortive techniques are 
quite similar to lockups in corporate merger-and-acquisition transactions, 
where they also can be both problematic and beneficial.37 
Finally, we need to consider how the parties might respond to a partial or 
complete ban of distortive techniques. One obvious possibility is that some dis-
tressed debtors that might otherwise reorganize under Chapter 11 would now 
be unable to do so and would be forced to resolve their distress through a sale 
of assets instead. To be sure, asset sales can be an effective solution to the debt-
or’s financial distress.38 But no one has a vote in an asset sale,39 and an anti-
distortion rule could misdirect debtors away from the traditional Chapter 11 
process when Chapter 11 would be the best solution to the debtor’s financial 
distress. 
These complicating factors suggest it would be a mistake to ban distortive 
techniques altogether. This doesn’t mean that distortive techniques should al-
ways be permitted, however. RSAs and deathtrap provisions sometimes do dis-
tort the voting process in indefensible ways. RSA fees sometimes appear to be 
little more than vote buying, for instance, and the structure of some deathtrap 
provisions is highly coercive. 
 
35. Janger & Levitin, supra note 16, at 186 (characterizing payments to signatories as “badges of 
opportunism”). Douglas Baird also appears to be skeptical of RSA fees, and he cites com-
plaints that the proposed fees in In re Caesars Entertainment Operating Co., 533 B.R. 714 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015) were “coercive” and “improper,” but concludes “they are somewhat 
rare.” See Baird, supra note 16, at 610. This is no longer true. 
36. This appears to have been true in the Momentive case, where the deathtrap’s terms reflected a 
dispute over a make-whole provision. See infra Section I.B. 
37. The analogy to corporate lockups (or breakup fees) is discussed in Section III.C. 
38. See Jean-Marie Meier & Henri Servaes, The Bright Side of Fire Sales, 32 REV. FIN. STUD. 4228, 
4230 (2019). For a more skeptical view, see Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bank-
ruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1, 8-11 (2007). 
39. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2018) (allowing the sale of assets if approved by a court a�er notice and 
a hearing). 
distorted choice in corporate bankruptcy 
377 
Thus far, courts seem to have taken a “know it when they see it” approach 
to the new distortive techniques. When a debtor agreed to exchange 100% of 
the company’s post-reorganization stock for a secured creditor’s $238 million 
claim—without doing a market test of the transaction or negotiating with any 
other creditors (including nearly $1.2 billion of other secured claims)—the 
court balked, finding that the agreement “breeds contempt rather than foster-
ing negotiations,” and refused to approve it.40 In most (though not all) other 
cases, courts have approved the distortive techniques. 
My goal in this Article is to offer additional guidance for the determinations 
courts are now making. I start with the standard assumption that the general 
objective of the bankruptcy process is value maximization. Chapter 11 does not 
seek to achieve this objective directly, however. Instead, it provides a frame-
work for renegotiating the parties’ entitlements that culminates with the Chap-
ter 11 voting process. An assessment of the new distortive techniques therefore 
needs to consider carefully both the parties’ entitlements and the procedural 
integrity of the Chapter 11 process. 
My analysis suggests that some distortive techniques should nearly always 
be permitted and others usually barred. Traditional deathtraps are an example 
of the former; exploding RSAs that give potential signatories only a brief peri-
od of time to decide are in the latter category. For distortive techniques that fall 
in the middle, I offer a handful of rules of thumb. I then apply the rules of 
thumb to four important recent cases. My analysis suggests that if bankruptcy 
judges clearly signal a willingness to strike down egregious uses of distortive 
techniques, the parties will adjust accordingly, eventually rendering court in-
tervention unnecessary in most cases.41 
Part I of the Article describes the new distortive techniques in more detail, 
using the RSA in the ResCap case42 and the deathtrap provision in the Mo-
mentive case43 as my principal illustrations. In Part II, I ask why bankruptcy 
courts have been so willing to condone their use, particularly given courts’ hos-
tility to distortion in other contexts. I argue that the answer lies in the dramatic 
recent changes that have made corporate reorganization much more difficult 
 
40. In re Innkeepers USA Tr., 442 B.R. 227, 234 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). The court also ques-
tioned the need to enter into the agreement so early in the case. See id. at 233. 
41. Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case 
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950-51 (1997) (describing how divorce law provides a frame-
work for parties to negotiate their rights and responsibilities and how o�en parties “resolve 
distributional questions . . . without bringing any contested issue to court for adjudica-
tion”). 
42. In re Residential Capital, LLC, 501 B.R. 549 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
43. In re MPM Silicones, LLC, 518 B.R. 740 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
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than in the past, coupled with the surprisingly unneutral baseline of the Chap-
ter 11 voting process. 
Parts III and IV develop and apply a framework for scrutinizing the new 
distortive techniques. Part III offers four rules of thumb. The first and second 
focus on the threat of holdout behavior and the magnitude of procedural or en-
titlement coercion. The third and fourth consider any independent justifica-
tions for a distortive technique that might warrant marginally more coercion 
and in rarer cases, any special contractual terms that might call for less. I con-
clude the Part by considering whether and when a creditor should be permitted 
to change its vote on a plan. In Part IV, I apply the rules of thumb to some 
complex recent cases: the elaborate RSA for Puerto Rico Electric Power Au-
thority (PREPA), Puerto Rico’s electricity company; the convoluted deathtrap 
provision in the Momentive case; and the use of both RSAs and deathtraps in 
two prominent coal-company reorganizations. 
Although my focus is on strategies that distort the Chapter 11 vote, the 
analysis has implications for a variety of related issues. In Part V, I consider two 
of the most obvious extensions: so-called gi�ing transactions in Chapter 11 and 
coercive bond exchanges outside of bankruptcy. Gi�ing transactions are espe-
cially interesting, because they are quite similar to RSAs and deathtrap provi-
sions in some respects, yet courts have viewed them with considerably more 
suspicion. I consider in Part V why this might be so. 
i .  the new distortive techniques 
When the dra�ers cra�ed current Chapter 11, they imagined the vote as the 
capstone of a three-step process. First, the debtor would negotiate over the 
terms of a potential restructuring with the senior creditor (usually a bank), the 
creditors’ committee (representing the widely scattered unsecured creditors), 
and the shareholders. The debtor would then ask the court to approve a disclo-
sure statement outlining the terms of the proposed plan, and to authorize the 
debtor to send ballots to each creditor or shareholder. Only then would a credi-
tor or shareholder accept or reject the plan, based on a simple assessment of the 
payout the plan promised to the claims or interests in the creditor’s or share-
holder’s class. 
In current cases, the voting process looks very different than the dra�ers 
envisioned. In most large cases, the debtor uses one or both of the new distor-
tive techniques to shape the Chapter 11 vote: RSAs to lock in the votes of many 
or most creditors before a disclosure statement is ever approved, and deathtrap 
provisions to entice creditors to vote “yes.” 
In this Part, I use two brief case studies to show how the new distortive 
techniques work. I begin with ResCap, which featured a prebankruptcy RSA 
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followed by a more comprehensive post-petition RSA. I then turn to Mo-
mentive, which included a clever deathtrap provision. In each context, I also de-
scribe variations on the distortive techniques that have been used in other cas-
es. 
A. RSAs (and PSAs): The ResCap Case 
Debtors use RSAs (and PSAs) to lock in creditor support for an anticipated 
reorganization plan. Sometimes arranged before bankruptcy and sometimes 
during the case, an RSA or PSA commits the creditors who sign the agreement 
to support any future reorganization plan that reflects the terms of the agree-
ment. 
Perhaps the best-known case with an extensive RSA/PSA is ResCap. Res-
Cap, which was spun off from General Motors in the early 2000s, was the par-
ent corporation of Residential Funding Company (RFC), one of the largest se-
curitizers of home mortgages in the early 2000s.44 RFC purchased mortgage 
loans from the lenders who made the original loans (sometimes called “corre-
spondent lenders”) and resold them into residential mortgage-backed securi-
ties (RMBS) trusts. Cash from investors in the trusts financed the trusts’ pur-
chase of the mortgage loans; the investors were then compensated from the 
payments that homeowners made on the underlying mortgage loans. 
When the housing market began to wobble in 2007 on the eve of the Great 
Recession, many of the underlying mortgages in the trusts started defaulting. 
This eventually prompted an onslaught of litigation against ResCap and RFC 
by investors in the trusts and monoline insurers who had insured the invest-
ment interests in many of the trusts. These plaintiffs alleged that RFC had mis-
represented the quality of the mortgage loans it included in the trusts. 
As ResCap teetered on the edge of bankruptcy in early 2012, it reached a 
settlement with the plaintiffs in the two largest groups of RMBS class-action 
claims and memorialized the settlement in a Plan Support Agreement that was 
intended to serve as the basis for a reorganization plan. Under the PSA, the 
RMBS investors would be given an $8.7 billion allowed claim in the bankrupt-
cy;45 under a companion agreement, Ally Financial, a former affiliate of Res-
 
44. ResCap’s business is summarized in a massive examiner’s report filed in the case. See Report 
of Arthur J. Gonzalez, as Examiner at III-1 to -6, In re Residential Capital, LLC, 501 B.R. 549 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 12-12020 (MG)). 
45. Affidavit of James Whitlinger, Chief Financial Officer of Residential Capital, LLC, in Sup-
port of Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Pleadings, ex. 10, at 9, In re Residential Capital, 
LLC, 501 B.R. 549 (No. 12-12020 (MG)), ECF No. 6. Exhibits 8 through 10 show the three 
Plan Support Agreements (PSAs). 
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Cap and RFC that did not file for bankruptcy, would contribute $750 million, 
as well as provide $220 million in debtor-in-possession financing to facilitate a 
sale of ResCap and its affiliates’ mortgage-servicing assets.46 The parties 
planned to sell the servicing assets almost immediately and to move the case 
quickly through Chapter 11.47 
Although the asset sale succeeded, garnering $2.1 billion, the original PSA 
met fierce resistance from other parties in the case. The Unsecured Creditors 
Committee insisted that the $8.7 billion claim was far too high,48 and a major 
monoline insurer condemned the agreement as “more about getting a release 
for Ally than achieving a fair and equitable deal.”49 A�er the debtor abandoned 
the agreement under an onslaught of opposition a few months later, a mediator 
was appointed (then-sitting Bankruptcy Judge James Peck), and the parties 
began negotiating a new PSA. 
Four months later, the parties agreed to a new PSA.50 The new PSA ulti-
mately encompassed more than twenty constituencies, including the debtors, 
Ally, the Unsecured Creditors Committee, the major RMBS claimants and the 
monoline insurers.51 The PSA included a term sheet detailing how each class 
would be treated under the reorganization plan contemplated by the PSA,52 as 
well as the structure of a trust that would be set up to pursue avoidance claims 
and other actions a�er confirmation of the plan.53 As is typical with these 
 
46. Id. ex. 8, at 6-7. Exhibit 8 shows the Plan Support Agreement with AFI. 
47. In an affidavit accompanying the filing, which came five days a�er the PSA was signed, 
ResCap’s chief financial officer predicted that ResCap would propose a reorganization plan 
within thirty days. Id. at 4. 
48. Objection of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to the Debtors’ Motion Pursu-
ant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019 for Approval of the RMBS Trust Settlement Agreements at 22, 
In re Residential Capital, LLC, 501 B.R. 549 (No. 12-12020 (MG)), ECF No. 2825. 
49. Objection of Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. and Certain Affiliates to Debtors’ Motion 
Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 for Order Approving RMBS Trust Settlement Agree-
ments at 7, In re Residential Capital, LLC, 501 B.R. 549 (No. 12-12020 (MG)), ECF No. 2791; 
see also id. at 2 (“The settlement . . . is an integral part of the Debtors’ efforts to obtain a 
third party release for parent Ally Financial, Inc. (“AFI”) and its nondebtor subsidia-
ries . . . .”). 
50. Debtor’s Motion for an Order Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 105(a) and 363(b) Authoriz-
ing the Debtors to Enter into and Perform Under a Plan Support Agreement with Ally Fi-
nancial Inc., the Creditors’ Committee, and Certain Consenting Claimants, ex. 3, In re Resi-
dential Capital, LLC, 501 B.R. 549 (No. 12-12020 (MG)), ECF No. 3814 [hereina�er ResCap 
PSA]. 
51. See Findings of Fact at 33, In re Residential Capital, 501 B.R. 549 (No. 12-12020 (MG)), ECF 
No. 6066. 
52. ResCap PSA, supra note 50, ex. B, at 2-16. 
53. Id. ex. B, annex II. 
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agreements, the PSA included milestones establishing a strict timeline for the 
plan-confirmation process: a definitive PSA agreement by May 23, 2013; the fil-
ing of a reorganization plan and disclosure statement, as well as court approval 
of the PSA, by July 3, 2013; and confirmation of the reorganization plan by De-
cember 15, 2013.54 To lock in the parties’ commitment, signatories were forbid-
den from objecting to the reorganization plan, directly or indirectly supporting 
any alternative plan,55 and transferring any portion of their claims unless the 
purchaser of their claim also agreed to be bound by the PSA.56 
The initial and final ResCap PSAs illustrate the two approaches commonly 
taken with RSAs and PSAs. The first version focused on the dominant class of 
creditors in the case, the billions of dollars of RMBS claims, whereas the final 
PSA was far more comprehensive. From the plan proponents’ perspective, 
there are obvious tradeoffs between the two. While it is easier to reach agree-
ment with a single key constituency than with numerous constituencies, a nar-
rower PSA is more likely to face serious pushback from other creditors. 
Neither PSA included a signing fee for parties that joined the agreement.57 
Recent agreements o�en do have such fees. The agreement in the PREPA reor-
ganization, for instance, promised signatories a “waiver and support” payment 
equivalent to 1.62% of their claims.58 Also, rather than an explicit fee, RSAs 
sometimes compensate their signatories in other ways, such as inviting them to 
participate in a rights offering.59 Even without these fees, the simplest PSA or 
RSA distorts the voting process by committing the signatories to vote in favor 
of a future plan; distortion is especially obvious when signatories receive a fee 
that is not available to those who do not sign the agreement. 
B. Deathtrap Plan Provisions: The Momentive Case 
The second distortive strategy is including a “deathtrap” provision in a 
proposed reorganization plan. In a traditional deathtrap, one class of creditors 
(or sometimes multiple classes) is told that it will receive a specified payout if 
the class votes in favor of the proposed reorganization and a worse payout if the 
 
54. Id. ex. A, at 4. 
55. Id. at 10. 
56. Id. at 12. 
57. The PSAs did compensate the plaintiffs’ attorneys by giving them substantial claims in the 
case. Id. ex. B, at 5. 
58. The PREPA RSA is discussed in detail in Section IV.A. 
59. This was the approach in In re Peabody Energy Corp., 933 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2019), discussed 
in Section IV.C.2. 
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class votes “no.” In many cases, the deathtrap promises a payment to the class if 
it votes in favor of a proposed plan but denies it anything if it votes against.60 
The leading recent case, In re MPM Silicones, LLC (o�en referred to as Mo-
mentive, the debtor’s trade name), included a more creative deathtrap.61 Mo-
mentive was a silicone and quartz manufacturer that had been acquired in 2006 
by Apollo, the well-known private-equity fund.62 A�er a highly contested set of 
negotiations, Momentive proposed a reorganization plan that employed a 
deathtrap provision to try to pin down its senior creditors (First and 1.5 Lien 
Noteholders). The deathtrap gave the senior creditors a choice. They could ac-
cept the plan, which promised full payment in cash but required the creditors 
to waive a $200 million make-whole claim,63 or they could reject the plan, as-
sert their make-whole claim, and receive replacement notes plus the cramdown 
rate of interest. Because the cramdown rate of interest o�en undercompensates 
creditors and the senior creditors’ success on their make-whole claim was high-
ly uncertain, the deathtrap structure put pressure on the senior creditors to ac-
cept the cash payout. 
The senior creditors nevertheless rejected the plan and chose to litigate the 
make-whole claim.64 This proved to be a mistake, as the bankruptcy court held 
that they were not entitled to the make-whole payment,65 a decision that was 
 
60. See, e.g., In re Zenith Elecs. Corp., 241 B.R. 92, 105 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999). 
61. 518 B.R. 740 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
62. Emily Glazer, Momentive Performance Preparing for Mid-April Bankruptcy Filing, WALL ST. J. 
(Apr. 1, 2014, 6:43 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/momentive-performance-
preparing-for-mid-april-bankruptcy-filing-1396388146 [https://perma.cc/SH53-XWDP]. 
63. In re MPM Silicones, L.L.C., 874 F.3d 787, 805 (2d Cir. 2017). A “make-whole” provision re-
quires a breaching promisor to pay a fee designed to compensate the promisee for profits 
lost as a result of the breach. In a loan contract, the lost profits o�en consist largely of unac-
crued interest payments. Some courts have enforced make-whole payments. See, e.g., In re 
Energy Future Holdings Corp., 842 F.3d 247, 261 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that the make-
whole provision must be honored); In re Sch. Specialty, Inc., No. 13-10125 (KJC), 2013 WL 
1838513, at *5 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 22, 2013) (concluding that a make-whole provision was a 
legitimate liquidated-damages provision, not unmatured interest, which would be precluded 
by section 502(b)(2)). Other courts have rejected them. See, e.g., In re MPM Silicones, LLC, 
531 B.R. 321, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, 874 F.3d 787, 794 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(holding that a make-whole provision was unenforceable because it did not “clearly and un-
ambiguously call for the payment of the make-whole premium in the event of an accelera-
tion of debt”). 
64. In re MPM Silicones, LLC, 518 B.R. at 749-51. 
65. Corrected and Modified Bench Ruling on Confirmation of Debtors’ Joint Chapter Plan of 
Reorganization for Momentive Performance Materials Inc. and its Affiliated Debtors at 29-
50, In re MPM Silicones, LLC, 518 B.R. 740 (No. 14-22503-rdd), ECF No. 979. 
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subsequently affirmed by the district court and the Second Circuit.66 A�er their 
prospects of winning on the make-whole provision deteriorated, the senior 
creditors sought to rescind their “no” vote on the reorganization plan and to 
take the originally offered cash payout. The bankruptcy court told the senior 
creditors that it was too late—their “no” vote could not be reversed.67 In effect, 
the court validated the coercive structure of the deathtrap treatment by refusing 
to undo it a�er the fact. 
In one sense, the deathtrap provision failed from the debtor’s perspective: it 
did not induce the senior creditors to abandon their make-whole claim and to 
vote in favor of the proposed reorganization plan. But it did enable Momentive 
to postpone the make-whole litigation until a�er the reorganization plan was 
confirmed. 
Some recent deathtrap provisions are tailored to individual creditors rather 
than to the class as a whole. The Arch Coal reorganization plan featured a 
deathtrap that promised a payout to individual creditors who voted in favor of 
the plan, even if the class as a whole rejected the plan.68 Creditors who voted 
against the plan would not receive any compensation if the class voted “no.” 
As with RSAs, bankruptcy courts regularly seem to approve the use of 
deathtraps in proposed reorganization plans. Other than a court rejecting the 
technique in one of the earliest cases featuring a deathtrap, they are nearly al-
ways permitted despite the distorting effect they have on creditors’ voting deci-
sions.69 
C. A Brief History of the New Distortive Techniques 
Having described how the new distortive techniques work, I briefly recount 
their emergence and evolution in the discussion that follows. 
 
66. In re MPM Silicones, LLC, 531 B.R. at 336-38, aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, 874 F.3d at 801-04. 
67. Order Denying Motion of the Requisite First Lien Noteholders Pursuant to Bankruptcy 
Rule 3018(a) to Change Votes Relating to Debtors’ Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization 
at 1-2, In re MPM Silicones, LLC, 518 B.R. 740 (No. 14-22503-rdd), ECF No. 1003; Order 
Denying Motion of the Requisite 1.5 Lien Noteholders to Change Their Votes from Reject-
ing to Accepting the Debtors’ Proposed Plan of Reorganization at 1-2, In re MPM Silicones, 
LLC, 518 B.R. 740 (No. 14-22503-rdd), ECF No. 1004. 
68. The Arch Coal deathtrap is discussed in Section IV.C.1. 
69. See infra Section II.B. 
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1. The Rise of Restructuring and Plan Support Agreements 
A�er occasional use in the 1980s and 90s,70 RSAs and PSAs began to pro-
liferate in the early 2000s. The Delaware courts encountered these agreements 
for the first time in 2002.71 Since 2010, RSAs have become increasingly preva-
lent. They are now found in most large cases, sometimes negotiated prior to 
the case and sometimes negotiated in bankruptcy. If the RSA is finalized before 
the case, the debtor generally asks to be permitted to assume the contract under 
bankruptcy’s executory-contract provision;72 if it is finalized during the case, 
the parties treat it as a settlement.73 
Why the rise of RSAs? One obvious reason is the much more compressed 
timeline of current bankruptcy cases than during the early years of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. The going-concern value of a troubled firm evaporates more 
quickly than in the past, and creditors routinely use their leverage to hasten the 
restructuring process.74 The early Chapter 11 cases o�en took years to com-
plete, and critics complained that courts’ willingness to extend repeatedly the 
debtor’s exclusive right to file a reorganization plan exacerbated this tenden-
cy.75 As creditors began using the terms of debtor-in-possession financing 
agreements and other contracts to speed up the case, and as fewer companies 
fit the old “bricks-and-mortar” pattern, debtors’ ability to chart a leisurely 
course in bankruptcy disappeared.76 Under pressure to emerge from bankrupt-
 
70. Agreements in In re Texaco Inc., 81 B.R. 813, 814-15 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988), and In re Kellogg 
Square P’ship, 160 B.R. 336, 338 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993), are early examples, although the 
terms “lock-up agreement,” “plan support agreement,” and “restructuring agreement” origi-
nated later. 
71. See In re Indianapolis Downs, LLC., 486 B.R. 286, 295 (Bankr. D. Del. 2013) (discussing In 
re NII Holdings, Inc., 288 B.R. 356 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002); and In re Stations Holding Co., 
No. 02-10882 (MFW), 2002 WL 31947022 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002)). 
72. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2018). 
73. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019. 
74. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The ‘New’ New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 
U. PA. L. REV. 917, 921-22 (2003); supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
75. Under 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (2018), the debtor has the exclusive right to file a reorganization 
plan for the first 120 days of the case. Prior to 2005, there was no limit on the number of 
times the bankruptcy judge could extend the exclusivity period (the limit is now eighteen 
months). 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d)(2)(A) (2018). The classic critique of the length of early Chap-
ter 11 cases is LoPucki, supra note 23, at 729-31. 
76. “[M]any contemporary businesses depend on knowledge and ideas rather than on hard as-
sets. Because these companies’ most important assets can walk out the door at any moment, 
they cannot afford to negotiate for months or years toward an eventual restructuring.” Skeel, 
supra note 74, at 922 (discussing postpetition financing and incentive compensation for 
managers as well); see, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 24, at 766, 784-85. 
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cy quickly, many debtors now put the contours of a potential reorganization in 
place before filing for bankruptcy, as part of a “pre-arranged” plan.77 An RSA 
helps lock in these commitments. 
Second, and closely related, is the disruptive effect of the emergence of per-
vasive claims trading. It wouldn’t be quite as essential to lock in creditors’ 
commitments if a debtor knew it would be dealing with the same body of cred-
itors throughout its Chapter 11 case. But the creditor base is constantly shi�ing 
in many current cases.78 Starting in the late 1980s, the market for distressed 
debt mushroomed,79 and now stands at roughly $773 billion, according to one 
measure.80 An investor can buy or sell a major stake in a corporate debtor al-
most instantaneously. Absent an RSA, the debtor could not be sure that the 
deal it struck with one set of creditors would be honored by subsequent pur-
chasers of these claims. RSAs solve this problem by contractually obligating 
any subsequent purchaser of claims to honor an RSA joined by the predeces-
sor.81 
These features of RSAs can be seen as mildly distorting Chapter 11 voting, 
since the signatories precommit to a future reorganization plan and will not be 
able to make a fresh decision whether to approve the plan when it is formally 
proposed. But the distortion is relatively limited, and Chapter 11 explicitly con-
templates that the debtor may secure votes on a potential reorganization prior 
to bankruptcy.82 
Some of the additional tools used by debtors to persuade investors to join 
an RSA in more recent cases are substantially more distortive.83 One standard 
inducement is a fee paid to creditors who sign the RSA. O�en called a support 
or commitment fee, the fee is characterized as compensation to the creditor for 
 
77. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673, 678-
79 (2003). 
78. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 648, 652 
(2010). For evidence that the instability is not quite as great as many think, see Ellias, supra 
note 27, at 774. 
79. See, e.g., Harner, supra note 29, at 710 n.22 (suggesting the expansion began a�er the 1987 
stock-market crash). 
80. Altman & Benhenni, supra note 30, at 23 (estimating the total face value of distressed and 
defaulted debt). 
81. Other factors may also contribute to RSAs’ popularity. A top bankruptcy lawyer recently 
told me that he thinks herd behavior among bankruptcy lawyers and financial advisors’ 
preference for a contractual arrangement have contributed to the spread of RSAs. Interview 
with James Sprayregen, Restructuring Partner, Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Jan. 7, 2020). 
82. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(g) (2018). 
83. Note that RSAs may raise other concerns, such as silencing of potential objections. But my 
concern here is voting distortions. 
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waiving her right to object to a proposed reorganization plan based on the 
RSA. The fee may also compensate creditors’ lawyers and other professionals 
for their efforts in negotiating the RSA. Because these fees ensure a greater 
payout for creditors who sign the RSA than those who do not, they introduce a 
distortion into Chapter 11 voting. The higher payout offered to signatories than 
nonsignatories creates pressure for creditors to join the RSA. 
Some RSAs add a further nudge by making their benefits “exploding,” 
offering the fee only to creditors who sign up within a specified time period—
say, within thirty days—or by giving larger benefits to those who sign on earli-
er. The proposed PREPA RSA, for instance, would provide immediate interest 
payments for early signatories but a later commencement for creditors who 
joined a�er the initial signing period. These features can put additional pres-
sure on creditors to agree to the RSA, and to do so quickly.84 
2. The Expanding Role of Deathtrap Provisions 
The early deathtrap plans could be described as “cramdowns on the cheap.” 
If a reorganization plan is consensual—that is, every class of creditors and 
shareholders votes to approve it—the bankruptcy judge does not need to de-
termine the precise value of the company and whether the priority of each class 
has been fully honored.85 By approving the plan, a class waives these objec-
tions. 
If one or more classes vote “no,” it is still possible for the plan to be con-
firmed through the “cramdown” alternative.86 But cramdown requires the 
court to determine the value of the company, because the court is required to 
ascertain whether the priority of the objecting class is being respected under 
the plan.87 For the first decade a�er the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978, 
 
84. Where the time pressure is severe, the effect is somewhat similar to the coercive Saturday 
Night Special tender offers sometimes made by takeover bidders in the 1960s. For a more 
detailed discussion of the analogy, see infra notes 139-140 and accompanying text. 
85. The requirements for confirming a plan consensually are set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) 
(2018), which includes the requirement that every class approve the plan, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1129(a)(8) (2018). 
86. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2018). 
87. A cramdown cannot be approved unless a court determines that classes higher in priority 
than the objecting class are not being overcompensated, and that the objecting class is either 
being fully compensated or no lower-priority class is receiving anything. E.g., Case v. L.A. 
Lumber Co., 308 U.S. 106, 116-19 (1939) (linking the absolute-priority rule to the “fair and 
equitable” requirement). Determining whether absolute priority is satisfied requires a valua-
tion of the firm and of any securities being provided as compensation. 
distorted choice in corporate bankruptcy 
387 
there was a strong bias toward consensual reorganization, and debtors were 
reticent to use the cramdown option.88 
The early deathtraps took advantage of the cramdown option without di-
rectly invoking it by proposing to cut off a class that voted “no.” This strategy 
offered two important benefits over a traditional cramdown. First, the death-
trap provision included a carrot—the prospect of a recovery that the target of 
the deathtrap (nearly always shareholders) would not otherwise receive—to 
encourage the target to vote for the plan. If the equity holders voted “yes,” 
there would be no need actually to attempt a cramdown. Second, the offer of 
compensation could shape the bankruptcy judge’s perception of the cramdown 
proposal if the class did vote “no.” If the class had the option of accepting a 
payout, a judge might be more willing to approve a plan that cut them off en-
tirely. The deathtrap added a “you had your chance” feature to the plan-
confirmation process. 
Most of the early deathtraps seem to have been designed to take advantage 
of these benefits and to cram down classes of equity—the lowest-priority clas-
ses in the priority waterfall—at a time when cramdowns were generally disfa-
vored.89 Although the aversion to cramming down equity has largely disap-
peared, deathtraps still are quite commonly used with classes of equity,90 as 
well as with junior creditors.91 But deathtraps have increasingly migrated up 
the priority hierarchy. In Momentive, the deathtrap provision was used with the 
senior class of creditors.92 
Like RSAs, deathtraps also have evolved beyond their traditional form. As 
Momentive shows, deathtraps now may involve a choice between two compen-
sation alternatives. In addition, individually targeted deathtraps seek to influ-
 
88. LoPucki and Whitford noted and criticized this bias in their massive study of large reorgani-
zation cases. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bank-
ruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 682 (1993); 
see also Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Preemptive Cram Down, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
625 (1991) (arguing that equity could be preemptively crammed down if the debtor is clearly 
insolvent). 
89. As discussed in Section II.B, courts were somewhat skeptical at first, striking deathtraps 
down in two early cases. See In re MCORP Fin., Inc., 137 B.R. 219, 236 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 
1992); In re Allegheny Int’l, Inc., 118 B.R. 282, 304 n.15 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990). 
90. See, e.g., Plan of Reorganization at 19, In re Parker Drilling, No. 18-36958 (MI) (Bankr. S.D. 
Tex. Mar. 7, 2019) (offering equity 1.65% of the new stock, subscription rights, and warrants 
if the class voted “yes,” and no distribution if they voted “no”). 
91. See, e.g., In re Samson Res. Corp., 590 B.R. 643, 646, 653 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017). 
92. See supra Section I.B. 
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ence individual creditors by offering them benefits for voting “yes” even when 
their class votes “no.”93 
All of these deathtraps are designed to counteract potential obstacles to 
confirmation. With shareholders (and in some cases, junior creditors), the con-
cern is that a reorganization plan cannot be confirmed consensually if the equi-
ty holders vote “no,” even if the equity appears to be deeply underwater. Given 
courts’ willingness to confirm cramdown plans that cut off equity, this is less 
troubling for plan proponents now than in the early years of the Bankruptcy 
Code. But the concern has not disappeared altogether. Plan proponents still 
would rather pursue a consensual plan than a cramdown given the expense and 
uncertainty of the process.94 
With more senior creditors, the principal concern is holdouts, and the most 
salient development is the dramatic rise of the distressed-debt market. In the 
world envisioned by the dra�ers of the 1978 Code, the creditors with whom the 
debtor was negotiating were creditors the debtor had dealt with prior to bank-
ruptcy and in many cases had an ongoing relationship. Today’s bankruptcy cas-
es look very different. By the time a substantial debtor files for bankruptcy, 
much of its debt is o�en held by hedge funds and other distressed-debt traders 
who have acquired stakes with the intention of using the tools available in the 
restructuring process to maximize the return on their investment. One key tool 
is bankruptcy’s voting rules. Because a class’s approval requires the support of 
two thirds of the debt in the class, a distressed-debt trader that holds one-third 
of a class’s debt has veto power over the vote of the class.95 A deathtrap can 
sometimes counteract that holdout threat. 
I should emphasize the concerns I have highlighted do not necessarily justi-
fy the use of deathtraps. They simply explain why deathtraps have emerged. I 
turn to whether the new distortive techniques should be permitted in the next 
Part. 
ii .  why is distortion tolerated?  
Before beginning this inquiry, I should pause to underscore just how puz-
zling bankruptcy courts’ tolerance of the new distortive techniques is. Else-
where in the law, attempts to distort a vote or other decisionmaking process are 
 
93. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text; infra notes 200-203 and accompanying text 
(describing the individually targeted deathtrap in Arch Coal). 
94. See In re Zenith Elecs. Corp., 241 B.R. 92, 105 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999). 
95. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2018) (providing that a class has accepted the plan if two thirds in 
amount and a majority in number of the creditors in the class vote in favor of the plan). 
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routinely condemned, especially if it is obvious how the distortion can be re-
moved. Indeed, we need only look to corporate law—which lies just across the 
insolvency line from bankruptcy—to find a starkly different response to the use 
of distortive techniques. The distortion at issue there involved freeze-out mer-
gers, and it arose during precisely the same period as RSAs and deathtrap pro-
visions began to proliferate in bankruptcy. 
The simplest way for a parent corporation to freeze out the nonparent 
shareholders of a subsidiary is to merge the subsidiary into the parent corpora-
tion (or into a newly created sub of the parent) through a traditional merger. 
But if the controller holds 90% of the controlled subsidiary’s stock, it can use 
Delaware’s short-form merger statute,96 which does not require a vote and for a 
while was subject to much less scrutiny than a traditional merger.97 To reach 
the 90% threshold, a controller may launch a tender offer for the shares of the 
subsidiary that the controller does not own. This is where distortion can slip 
in. The controller could significantly increase its prospects of success by hinting 
that shares that are not tendered into the offer will face an unappealing fu-
ture—a nudge somewhat similar to the strategy used with deathtrap provi-
sions.98 Rather than permitting this strategy, as bankruptcy courts have done 
with RSAs and deathtraps, the Delaware courts decisively acted to end the 
practice. They sharply expanded the definition of impermissible “coercion” and 
made clear they would enjoin any tender offer that distorted minority share-
holders’ decision whether to tender.99 
 
96. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (2019). 
97. In Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 246 (Del. 2001), the Delaware Su-
preme Court made clear that short-form mergers would be upheld in the absence of egre-
gious misbehavior. For criticism of the divergent treatment (at that time) of the two ap-
proaches to freezeouts, see Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2, 20-21 
(2005). 
98. Threatening to freeze out subsequently, at a lower price, any shareholder who did not ten-
der, or to delist any stock that was not tendered, would be especially effective but probably 
deemed coercive even under a narrower definition of coercion. But simply remaining mum 
about what would happen to nontendering shares would not be coercive under the tradi-
tional definition and would still create pressure to tender because shareholders might fear 
adverse consequences, such as eventual delisting. 
99. In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002). In the Pure Resources 
case, then-Vice Chancellor Leo Strine announced that a controlling shareholder’s tender 
offer would be enjoined as coercive unless it satisfied three requirements. The controlling 
shareholder must (1) include a nonwaivable condition promising not to go through with the 
tender offer unless a majority of the minority shareholders tender their shares; (2) commit 
to a prompt short-form merger at the same price as the tender offer if it obtains more than 
90% of the shares; and (3) refrain from any threats to shareholders who do not tender. Id. at 
445. 
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Why have bankruptcy judges responded so differently? To answer this 
question, I begin by considering the structure of bankruptcy law itself, which 
leads to a surprising discovery: the Chapter 11 vote was never intended to be 
truly neutral. This structural feature of Chapter 11, along with several other fea-
tures of the new distortive techniques, suggests that the techniques are not al-
ways pernicious, or so I argue in Section II.B. 
A. The Baseline Is Not Neutral. 
If the Chapter 11 vote were an ordinary vote, the new distortive techniques 
would be deeply problematic. Deathtraps and RSAs are designed to distort the 
vote by nudging, and in some cases, coercing the parties to support the plan. 
This is precisely what we try to prevent in ordinary voting processes. 
But if we take a closer look at the structure of Chapter 11, it turns out the 
Chapter 11 vote is not designed to be an ordinary vote. The baseline is not neu-
tral. To the contrary, Chapter 11 is subtly biased toward confirmation of a reor-
ganization plan at each stage of the case. This does not mean that most cases 
will result in confirmed reorganization plans, of course. But the baseline is tilt-
ed toward confirmation, which puts the new distortive techniques in a very 
different light. 
Start with the beginning of a case. When a debtor files for bankruptcy, it is 
nearly impossible for creditors to reverse the filing and restore the status quo. 
Although creditors sometimes do challenge the filing, arguing that the debtor 
has entered bankruptcy in bad faith, these objections usually fail.100 Absent an 
admission by the debtor’s managers that the company really does not need to 
be in bankruptcy, the debtor is permitted to remain in bankruptcy, even if it 
appears to be solvent when the bankruptcy petition is filed.101 Unlike with 
mergers or other fundamental corporate transactions, which can be stopped if 
shareholders vote “no,” neither shareholders nor creditors have an opportunity 
to thwart a bankruptcy filing. 
Once the debtor has entered bankruptcy, the process moves toward a vote 
that is implicitly coercive. Even if the debtor proposes a traditional reorganiza-
 
100. For a discussion of the early case law, see Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The 
Implied Good Faith Filing Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 NW. U. L. 
REV. 919, 924-27, 933-37 (1991). 
101. SGL Carbon was the rare exception. The company issued a press release proclaiming that it 
was “financially healthy” and had filed for bankruptcy solely to resolve “exces-
sive . . . demands” by the plaintiffs in antitrust litigation. In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 
154, 157 (3d Cir. 1999). The Third Circuit held that “filing . . . merely to obtain tactical litiga-
tion advantages” did not constitute good faith. Id. at 165. 
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tion plan, the proposed payout to a particular class may be backed by an im-
plicit threat to cram down the class involuntarily if it votes “no.” This threat is 
particularly potent with lower-priority creditors and shareholders, since they 
risk receiving nothing in a cramdown if the debtor is deeply insolvent. So if the 
plan offers to give shareholders warrants to purchase stock in the newly reor-
ganized company, for instance, shareholders know that the debtor may simply 
ask the court to approve a cramdown plan that cuts them off altogether if they 
vote “no.” 
A traditional plan also carries the implicit threat that if creditors vote “no” 
the debtor will convert the case to Chapter 7, and the company will be liquidat-
ed.102 In a piecemeal liquidation, creditors may receive considerably less than if 
the company is reorganized or sold through a going-concern sale. 
To be sure, creditors—especially creditors on whom the debtor depends—
are not helpless against these features of Chapter 11. The debtor-in-possession 
financer may insist that the debtor sell its assets in a bankruptcy sale rather 
than going through a full-blown Chapter 11 reorganization.103 Creditors also 
may give the debtor’s managers performance-based compensation to incentiv-
ize a prompt, effective reorganization.104 But the Chapter 11 process itself is co-
ercive. 
Thus far, I have focused on Chapter 11’s bias toward confirming a reorgani-
zation plan, without attempting to explain why Chapter 11 has this bias. Histor-
ically, lawmakers (prodded by restructuring professionals) were concerned 
about holdout creditors interfering with a beneficial restructuring;105 this was 
the rationale for including a vote that would bind objecting creditors. Further, 
the legislative history of the current Bankruptcy Code indicates that Congress 
believed reorganization is o�en preferable to liquidation, because it better pre-
serves value for creditors and jobs for employees.106 In my view, the nudge to-
 
102. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(a) (2018) (giving the debtor broad discretion to convert a Chapter 11 
case to Chapter 7). 
103. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 74, at 926 n.34 (describing the FAO Schwartz and United Airlines 
bankruptcies). 
104. Id. at 926-28. 
105. See, e.g., Lloyd K. Garrison, Corporate Reorganization Under the Federal Bankruptcy Power, 19 
VA. L. REV. 317, 317-18 (1933) (advocating for the codification of large-scale corporate reor-
ganization). 
106. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 220 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179 
(“The purpose of a business reorganization case . . . is to restructure a business’s finances so 
that it may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and pro-
duce a return for its stockholders. The premise of a business reorganization is that assets 
that are used for production in the industry for which they were designed are more valuable 
than those same assets sold for scrap.”). 
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ward confirmation is defensible on normative grounds,107 in addition to being 
consistent both with the structure of Chapter 11 and with lawmakers’ intent. 
B. The Case for Permitting (Some) Distortion 
Bankruptcy’s nonneutral baseline seems to be a key reason for bankruptcy 
judges’ willingness to allow the distortive techniques. At the outset, however, 
some were skeptical. In Allegheny International, for instance, the court declined 
to enforce a provision in the reorganization plan providing that if any class of 
shareholders voted “no,” it and any lower-priority class of shareholders would 
not receive any recovery.108 “[T]here is no authority in the Bankruptcy Code,” 
the court concluded, “for discriminating against classes who vote against a plan 
of reorganization.”109 Two years later, another bankruptcy court—in what 
seems to be the first case to use the term “deathtrap”—rejected a somewhat 
similar provision that would have denied any recovery to three classes of share-
holders if the first shareholder class voted against the plan.110 The court con-
cluded that this provision “results in the plan[] not being fair and equitable.”111 
By the end of the decade, a Delaware bankruptcy judge found nothing 
problematic about a provision promising new debentures to a class of bond-
holders if they voted in favor of the plan, but no recovery if they rejected it. Us-
ing almost identical language as the earlier cases, but inserting the word “no,” 
the court said: 
  There is no prohibition in the Code against a Plan proponent offer-
ing different treatment to a class depending on whether it votes to ac-
cept or reject the Plan. One justification for such disparate treatment is 
that, if the class accepts, the Plan proponent is saved the expense and 
uncertainty of a cramdown fight.112 
 
107. One caveat: I would define the objective as achieving an efficient resolution of financial dis-
tress, rather than treating reorganization as inherently good in itself, as some of the legisla-
tive history does. The bias toward confirmation seems fully compatible with efficient resolu-
tion, in part because it counteracts strategic behavior. 
108. In re Allegheny Int’l, Inc., 118 B.R. 282, 304 n.15 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990). 
109. Id. 
110. In re MCorp Fin., Inc., 137 B.R. 219, 236 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992). 
111. Id. In the Drexel Burnham bankruptcy, by contrast, the court upheld a plan provision that 
offered warrants to classes that accepted the plan but nothing if they rejected. In re Drexel 
Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 140 B.R. 347, 350 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
112. In re Zenith Elecs. Corp., 241 B.R. 92, 105 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999) (emphasis added) (citation 
and footnote omitted). 
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Put another way: since the deathtrap plan was simply incorporating the 
effect of a possible cramdown into a consensual plan, it was no more coercive 
than a Chapter 11 cramdown already is and should not be seen as problematic. 
Although this logic may justify a traditional deathtrap provision, it does not 
explain courts’ willingness to permit other distortive techniques, such as sign-
ing-fee RSAs or individually targeted deathtraps. Several leading bankruptcy 
scholars have in fact essentially proposed that signing-fee RSAs be banned.113 
But the nature of current bankruptcy practice and of the distortive techniques 
themselves suggests the need for a more nuanced approach even to these tech-
niques. 
First, given the dramatic change in bankruptcy practice discussed earlier, 
the new distortive techniques can be seen as restoring the balance—with its tilt 
toward confirmation—contemplated in the structure of the Bankruptcy Code. 
RSAs make a speedy reorganization more feasible and counteract the destabi-
lizing effect of claims trading on the creditor base. If RSA fees are o�en used to 
co-opt problematic holdouts,114 they may at least sometimes be defensible, 
even if mildly offensive, for much the same reason as vote buying is sometimes 
permitted in corporate law.115 The same logic also applies to deathtrap provi-
sions.116 
Second, Chapter 11 is not designed to pick a single, most-favored result, as 
votes in many other contexts are. The vote in a large case consists of numerous 
different votes, one for each class of creditors or shareholders. Rather than se-
lecting a single optimal outcome, the votes are designed as a check on the larger 
renegotiation process.117 
Third, creditors in a Chapter 11 case are not as vulnerable to prisoners’ di-
lemma concerns as shareholders deciding how to respond to a tender offer out-
side of bankruptcy. The creditors are much less widely scattered. The bond 
 
113. According to these scholars, payments to signatories should be viewed as a “badge of oppor-
tunism.” Janger & Levitin, supra note 16, at 169. 
114. Ironically, the same voting rules that were originally put in place to discipline holdouts now 
invite holdouts, due to how high they are set. 
115. See Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 22-26 (Del. Ch. 1982) (approving vote buying when the 
transaction was approved by shareholders). 
116. Notice also that, unlike with a tender offer, investors who decline the proposed treatment in 
the context of a deathtrap with differential consideration will not retain their existing inter-
est in the company. Their interest, like the interest of investors who vote “yes,” will be trans-
formed. 
117. Consider, by way of contrast, the vote on a merger or other fundamental transaction in cor-
porate law. These votes o�en have an up-or-down quality similar to that of votes in other 
contexts. 
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debt of a publicly held company tends to be much more concentrated than 
stock, and first and second liens generally are concentrated as well.118 Even if 
creditors were widely scattered, unsecured creditors are represented by a credi-
tors’ committee a�er the Chapter 11 case is filed.119 As a result, creditors can 
more easily coordinate than shareholders confronted with a coercive tender 
offer can—or the prisoners operating in a prisoners’ dilemma game can. 
Fourth, the creditors who negotiate an RSA may incur very real costs that 
are not borne by creditors who are not involved in the negotiations. The prin-
cipal costs are the fees of a signatory’s bankruptcy lawyers and financial advi-
sors. There may also be other costs, such as the cost of forgoing trading while 
the parties are negotiating the terms of the RSA and being subject to nondis-
closure obligations. An RSA fee may compensate these creditors for some of 
their costs, and in doing so reduces the extent to which other creditors can free-
ride on the negotiations of signatories to the agreement. 
Finally, we also need to consider how the parties would respond if all vot-
ing distortions were banned. One obvious possibility is that some distressed 
debtors that might otherwise reorganize under Chapter 11 would now be una-
ble to do so, and would be forced to resolve their distress through a sale of as-
sets instead.120 To be sure, asset sales are sometimes an effective solution to a 
debtor’s financial distress.121 But there is less democracy in an asset sale, not 
more, since debtors’ creditors and shareholders do not have any vote at all in an 
asset sale.122 And a ban on distortive techniques could lead to more sales in cas-
es where sales are inefficient, and the traditional Chapter 11 process would pro-
duce a superior result.123 
 
118. See generally Marcel Kahan, The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 Nw. U. 
L. REV. 565, 584 (1994) (noting the high concentration of bond holdings). 
119. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (2018) (requiring the United States Trustee to appoint a committee 
of creditors holding unsecured claims). 
120. Sales of assets have been a common alternative to the traditional Chapter 11 process in the 
past several decades. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 77, at 675 & n.6 (discussing the rise 
of sales). 
121. See, e.g., Meier & Servaes, supra note 38, at 4231 (finding that the welfare loss of sales is low-
er than is o�en thought). 
122. The provision governing asset sales is 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2018), which requires only that 
the court authorize the sale a�er notice and a hearing. For discussion of the additional safe-
guards courts tend to apply, see Mark J. Roe & David A. Skeel, Jr., Assessing the Chrysler 
Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727, 739-41 (2010). 
123. The classic context in which traditional Chapter 11 may be superior to a sale is where the 
highest-valuing potential purchasers are themselves financially distressed. See Andrei Shleif-
er & Robert W. Vishny, Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach, 
47 J. FIN. 1343, 1344 (1992). 
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It might be possible to achieve some of the benefits of the new distortive 
techniques while limiting their distortion of the voting process. Under existing 
law, bankruptcy courts can award compensation to a creditor that makes a 
“substantial contribution in a case.”124 Courts could use this provision to re-
ward creditors who perform the public good of negotiating a reorganization 
plan, while banning RSA fees. The problem with this approach is that it repli-
cates only some of the benefits of the distortive technique. Perhaps most im-
portantly, it would remove the debtor’s ability to use RSA fees to counteract the 
threat of holdouts. 
I do not mean to suggest there is no reason for concern about the new dis-
tortive techniques. There is. But the potential benefits of counteracting holdout 
problems and reducing free-riding, as well as creditors’ ability to coordinate, 
suggest that distortive techniques should be scrutinized in a more nuanced 
fashion, not simply disallowed. 
An analogy to corporate law may once again be helpful. Courts were initial-
ly quite skeptical of corporate voting agreements, o�en striking them down for 
interfering with directorial functions or on other grounds.125 As courts recog-
nized the potential benefits of voting arrangements, which are loosely analo-
gous to those of RSAs, the hostility to these arrangements began to dissipate. 
Courts adopted a more nuanced approach, enforcing most voting agreements 
in close corporations but striking down agreements that appear to be perni-
cious.126 
iii .  rules of thumb for the new distortive techniques 
I have argued thus far that the distortions in current bankruptcy practice 
can be problematic but sometimes serve a valuable function. It would therefore 
be a mistake simply to outlaw the distortions altogether. 
How should bankruptcy judges determine which distortive techniques to 
permit? The current approach has a “know-it-when-I-see-it” quality: the 
courts have approved most deathtraps and RSAs but occasionally strike one 
 
124. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(D) (2018). 
125. See, e.g., McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234, 237 (N.Y. 1934) (striking down the voting 
agreement because it would interfere with directors’ oversight role). 
126. See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577, 587 (Ill. 1964) (upholding shareholder agreement); 
Zion v. Kurtz, 405 N.E.2d 681, 684 (N.Y. 1980) (same). But see Puro v. Puro, 393 N.Y.S.2d 
633, 637 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (declining to enforce a provision requiring appointment of a par-
ticular person as director where the person had committed misconduct). For an extensive 
survey of cases, see 1 AM. BAR ASS’N, MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT ANNOTATED 7-254 
to -261 (4th ed. 2008). 
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down if it seems excessive. In this Part, I outline four rules of thumb that might 
provide additional structure to courts’ analysis. I conclude by considering 
whether creditors should be permitted to change their votes when their vote 
was shaped by distortive techniques. 
A. Are Holdouts Present (or Likely)? 
We tend to assume that coercion is pernicious and should always be rooted 
out. But coercion can sometimes be beneficial.127 The prisoner’s dilemma itself 
is perhaps the best illustration. Few would argue that the threat of a higher 
prison sentence if a criminal defendant declines to confess, as in the prisoner’s 
dilemma, should be prohibited.128 The Bankruptcy Code veers into somewhat 
similar terrain by including liquidation and cramdown options, each of which 
nudge the parties toward approval of a proposed reorganization plan. 
Each of bankruptcy’s new distortive techniques can sometimes be justified 
in these terms. As we have seen, an RSA streamlines the reorganization process 
and reduces the risk that initial support for a plan will dissolve as potentially 
supportive creditors sell their claims to buyers who may view the claims differ-
ently. An RSA also may discourage problematic holdout behavior, especially if 
it gives a support fee to signatories. Deathtraps can also serve beneficial func-
tions by helping counteract holdout behavior. Traditional deathtraps are essen-
tially a simplified form of cramdown. 
The potential for distortive techniques to counteract potential problems 
suggests an initial rule of thumb: courts should ask whether the distortion is in 
fact playing this role—whether it counteracts a potential threat to the reorgani-
zation process.129 To be sure, bankruptcy judges already have the option of dis-
qualifying votes cast in bad faith. If a creditor’s behavior is clearly designed to 
obstruct the reorganization process, a judge can invalidate its vote.130 But this 
is a blunt tool. Holdout creditors o�en do not telegraph their intention to tor-
pedo the process, and the line between aggressive bargaining and destructively 
 
127. For a classic analysis of the complexities of coercion and the importance of the baseline from 
which it is assessed, see Peter Westen, “Freedom” and “Coercion”—Virtue Words and Vice 
Words, 1985 DUKE L.J. 541, 558-89.  
128. I borrow this example from an excellent article by Susan Kuo and Benjamin Means. Susan S. 
Kuo & Benjamin Means, Collective Coercion, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1599, 1603-04, 1604 n.18 (2016). 
129. My use of the term “threat” is not altogether coincidental. It echoes a key feature of Dela-
ware’s takeover jurisprudence. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 
(Del. 1985). 
130. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (2018) (authorizing courts to “designate” votes not cast in good 
faith). 
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holding out is fuzzy. A distortive technique is a less draconian response to 
holdout behavior. 
In some cases, there may be an identifiable, strategically minded holdout 
creditor. The Momentive senior lenders, whom the district court judge de-
scribed as using their intercreditor agreement as “a sword to enable the [lend-
ers] to work around the Bankruptcy Code,” may be an example.131 An RSA or a 
deathtrap provision can be justified as a means of diminishing such creditors’ 
incentive to hold out. 
Suppose no identifiable holdout creditor has emerged. How might a court 
gauge the likelihood of a threat to the reorganization process? One obvious 
proxy for the threat of holdout behavior is a liquid claims-trading market for 
the company’s debt. If claims are actively traded, distressed-debt traders can 
easily take a blocking position in any given class of debt. Courts should be open 
to distortive techniques in this context. 
If there is no identifiable holdout creditor and claims are not actively trad-
ed, by contrast, distortive techniques are less justified. This will o�en be the 
case with small or midsized debtors, for instance, or with large debtors if the 
bankruptcy judge has imposed a freeze on claims trading. If a particular class of 
claims is not actively traded, this also may weigh against permitting distortive 
techniques, even if there is a vibrant market for claims of other classes. 
Beyond looking for identifiable holdout creditors and actively traded claims 
markets, courts should also consider a creditor’s holdings in other classes. In 
many large cases, some creditors hold claims in multiple classes, and these 
crossholdings can increase a creditor’s incentive to hold out. Similarly, a credi-
tor that has a substantial claim against one subsidiary might implicitly threaten 
to thwart the reorganization of the parent unless the subsidiary claim is given 
disproportionately favorable treatment. The debtor might also be justified in 
using a deathtrap or RSA to counter this holdout threat. 
In most large corporate bankruptcies, the risk of problematic holdout be-
havior will be significant. But if holdouts are unlikely to be a major concern, 
the court should police distortive techniques much more aggressively. 
 
131. In re MPM Silicones, L.L.C., 596 B.R. 416, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
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B. How Coercive Is the Distortive Technique? 
The extent of the holdout risk needs to be considered jointly with a second 
factor, the coerciveness of the distortive technique.132 If the holdout risk is se-
vere, a more coercive technique may be justified; if not, it is not.133 
The simplest RSAs and traditional deathtraps are at the weak end of the co-
ercion spectrum. An RSA that does not include a signing bonus or other in-
ducement, as with the ResCap PSA discussed earlier, commits signatories to 
supporting a reorganization plan that accords with the terms of the RSA. To be 
sure, this commitment is mildly coercive, but it is justified by the need to en-
sure that subsequent claims trading does not undermine the deal that has been 
put in place.134 
Traditional deathtraps are analogous to a simple RSA. In a traditional 
deathtrap, all of the creditors (or shareholders) in the class receive a payout if 
the class votes “yes,” and all of them receive nothing if they vote “no.” A tradi-
tional deathtrap is coercive, but only weakly so. From the perspective of the 
creditors in the class, it is an assurance game rather than a prisoner’s dilem-
ma.135 If the payout is too low, the class can reject it. To be sure, the class does 
run the risk of receiving nothing if it votes “no,” but this simply reflects the 
structure of Chapter 11—the baseline is not neutral, as we have seen. The coer-
civeness of a simple RSA or traditional deathtrap is limited. Each should be 
permitted unless there is little or no risk of holdouts. 
A signing-fee RSA is more coercive. Because joiners receive different—and 
higher—overall consideration than those who do not join, there is greater pres-
sure for creditors to join, akin to a structurally coercive tender offer in corporate 
 
132. Oscar Couwenberg and Stephen Lubben also have noted the possibility of coercion with 
RSAs. Oscar Couwenberg & Stephen J. Lubben, Private Benefits Without Control? Modern 
Chapter 11 and the Market for Corporate Control, 13 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 145, 166 
(2018). 
133. The first two rules of thumb are somewhat similar to the two prongs of the Unocal test in 
corporate law, which applies when the directors of a target corporation use defensive 
measures. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 953. 
134. Moreover, it is not clear that most RSAs are truly binding. At least one top bankruptcy law-
yer almost never seeks court approval of RSAs in his cases, based on his view that parties 
generally honor RSAs but would not be legally bound if they withdrew from the RSA due to 
changed circumstances. Interview with James Sprayregen, supra note 81. 
135. Kuo & Means, supra note 128, at 1614-15. In an assurance game, “all players can win by coop-
erating” and assuring each other that they will play the riskier and mutually preferred strat-
egy. Id. at 1615; see also Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, 
Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 220-22 (2009) (providing an illustration of an 
assurance game). 
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law.136 The inclusion of a fee alters creditors’ entitlements, since it means they 
will get one payout if they sign the RSA (their pro rata recovery plus the fee) 
and another if they do not (just their pro rata recovery). As a result, even a 
creditor who believes the payout proposed by the RSA is too low may feel pres-
sured to join, lest she be le� with the worst possible outcome: enough of her 
fellow creditors join the RSA to provide a vote in favor of the proposed reor-
ganization plan, and she doesn’t get the RSA fee.137 
Some RSAs add procedural coercion to the entitlement coercion created by 
a fee. These exploding RSAs may require creditors to join quickly—say, within 
two weeks—or encourage creditors to join early by promising interim pay-
ments that begin as soon as the creditor joins.138 An RSA that couples a fee 
with a short joinder period calls to mind the old Saturday Night Special tender 
offers that gave shareholders very little time to decide whether to tender their 
shares and were made available on a first-come, first-served basis.139 Saturday 
Night Specials were banned a few years a�er they emerged.140 
RSAs can create another form of procedural coercion as well—they can cut 
off other parties’ and the court’s access to information. If the RSA forbids sig-
natories from criticizing the reorganization plan, it could silence a potentially 
 
136. In a structurally coercive tender offer, the bidder tenders for some or all of the shares of a 
target corporation and signals that shareholders who do not tender will be subject to a 
freezeout at a lower price or will find their shares devalued in other ways. This can give 
shareholders an incentive to tender even if they believe the offer is inadequate, since they 
fear the even worse treatment they will receive if enough of their fellow shareholders tender 
into the offer and the bidder ends up with control. Delaware signaled its disapproval of 
structurally coercive tender offers in Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956, and blatant two-tier tender 
offers largely disappeared therea�er. See also In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 
421, 445-47 (Del. Ch. 2002) (making clear that more subtle variations on the strategy—such 
as manipulating the majority of the minority requirement—also will be treated as improper-
ly coercive). 
137. Fees that are available only to a limited subgroup of creditors also may give a windfall to 
these creditors. See infra Section IV.C.2 (discussing the Peabody Energy case). 
138. The Peabody Energy RSA is an example of the former and the PREPA RSA of the latter. They 
are discussed in Sections IV.C.2 and IV.A, respectively. 
139. A bidder might make a tender offer for 50% of the shares, for instance, and end the offer as 
soon as 50% of shares had been tendered, excluding shareholders who tendered later. 
140. The Williams Act of 1968 outlawed Saturday Night Specials by requiring that tender offers 
treat late joiners the same as early joiners. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, § 3(d)(7), 82 
Stat. 454, 457 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The Securities 
and Exchange Commission promulgated regulations under the Williams Act that required 
tender offers be held open for at least twenty days. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (2019). For an 
overview of the Williams Act changes, see, for example, Note, The Developing Meaning of 
“Tender Offer” Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1254-60 
(1973). 
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important source of information—especially if the signatories are sophisticated 
parties and nonsignatories less so.141 The court should consider the informa-
tional impact when assessing the coerciveness of an RSA. 
As with RSAs, deathtrap provisions can take more coercive forms. Under 
the plan of adjustment initially proposed for Puerto Rico, for instance, bond-
holders whose debt had been challenged as unconstitutional were given a 
choice either to accept a 35% payout or reject the payout and litigate the consti-
tutionality of their debt, with the prospect of receiving a higher payout if they 
succeeded and nothing if they lost.142 Rather than all receiving the same con-
sideration, the creditors who accepted the payout would receive different con-
sideration than those who rejected it.143 
The larger the fee or differential compensation is in relation to the amount 
of a creditor’s claim, the more coercive it will be. Suppose a creditor has a $100 
claim, the total amount of claims in the creditor’s class is $1000, and the credi-
tor believes that $600 for the class (thus, $60 for her claim) would be an ap-
propriate recovery: she would vote “yes” if the reorganization plan offered her 
class at least $600 or “no” if it offered less. If the debtor were negotiating an 
RSA that offered $400 to the class and a 2.5% fee to each creditor who signed 
the RSA, the 2.5% fee would not be especially coercive. The creditor would re-
ceive less than other creditors in her class if she declined to sign and the plan 
eventually was approved, but the difference would not be substantial.144 If the 
RSA offered $400 and a 15% fee, by contrast, the RSA would be much more 
coercive. Although the creditor’s potential recovery ($55) would be less than 
what she considers fair, if she voted “no” and a sufficiently high majority of her 
fellow creditors voted “yes,” she would be stuck with a far inferior recovery 
($40). Faced with this prospect, she might sign the RSA, despite believing that 
the offer is inadequate. Notice that the fee would be even more coercive if the 
debtor structured it as a fixed total amount ($150) rather than a percentage, 
 
141. For discussion of this concern with RSAs, see Baird, supra note 16, at 617-19, which con-
cludes that the silencing was not problematic in the cases under discussion. 
142. See Title III Joint Plan of Adjustment of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, et al. at 3-4, In 
re Fin. Oversight Mgmt. Bd., No. 17-BK-3283-LTS (D.P.R. Sept. 27, 2019) (defining “2014 
CW Bond Settlement” and “2014 Settling CW Bond Distribution”). 
143. Although individually targeted deathtraps may seem to directly violate Chapter 11, they ac-
tually do not. Chapter 11 requires that every member of a class of creditors be given the same 
consideration. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) (2018). But the stricture is waived if a creditor agrees 
to the divergent consideration. Id. If the individually targeted deathtrap gives creditors a 
choice, it technically satisfies this requirement. 
144. Assuming the plan was approved, the creditor would receive $42.50 ($40 plus a $2.50 fee) if 
she voted “yes” and $40 if she voted “no.” 
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since signatories would receive amounts not claimed by other creditors in the 
class.145 
Deathtraps can create the same issues of entitlement coercion as RSA 
fees.146 The larger the difference in compensation is in comparison to the size 
of a creditor’s claim, the more coercive the deathtrap will be. And if compensa-
tion is structured as a pool of compensation, rather than a fixed amount for 
each creditor that votes “yes,” the coercion increases. 
In each context, the fee will be more coercive if the signing protocol also in-
cludes procedural coercion. An exploding RSA will be more coercive than an 
RSA that does not favor early joiners or provides only a brief opportunity to 
join. 
C. The Presence of Independent Justifications 
The third factor that sometimes comes into play is the presence of inde-
pendent justifications for the distortive technique. If the RSA or deathtrap re-
sponds to the risk of problematic holdouts and is not coercive, the court may 
not need to consider the third rule of thumb. But in borderline cases, the pres-
ence or absence of independent justifications can be quite important. 
The creditors who negotiate the terms of an RSA—and thus the terms of a 
potential reorganization plan—provide a public good, since reorganization may 
be valuable for everyone, and they also forgo the opportunity to trade during 
the negotiations. The dra�ers of the Bankruptcy Code assumed the creditors’ 
committee would play this role, rather than individual creditors.147 But in cur-
rent cases, the creditors’ committee o�en is not the principal locus of negotia-
tions, because, among other reasons, distressed-debt funds may prefer to form 
their own ad hoc committees, or the “fulcrum” class—the class that will be con-
verted into equity post-reorganization—is a class of lien creditors rather than 
 
145. Suppose, for instance, that if the creditor joins the RSA, the RSA will have 80% ($800) of 
support in the class. The creditors with $800 worth of claims would share the $150 pool, 
which means that the creditor would receive an $18.75 fee ($100/$800 x $150) on account of 
her $100 claim, rather than the $15 she would receive if the fee were 15%. In this case, the 
creditor would receive $58.50 if she joined the RSA, and $40 if she did not, if the plan were 
ultimately approved. 
146. Procedural coercion is less o�en an issue with deathtraps because bankruptcy law regulates 
the voting process. Bankruptcy procedure rules require that creditors be given at least twen-
ty-eight days’ notice of the disclosure-statement hearing, FED. R. BANKR. P. 3017(a), and 
bankruptcy courts generally give them several weeks to vote a�er the disclosure statement 
and ballots have been distributed. 
147. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 Reorgani-
zation Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461, 525-28 (1992). 
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the general creditors represented by the creditors’ committee.148 If the RSA fee 
is available to all creditors, even those that did not contribute to the negotia-
tions, the public-good justification is weaker for the later-joining creditors, 
even though they too bear some costs, such as the obligation to bind any trans-
fers of their claim to the RSA. Moreover, a more inclusive RSA fee reduces the 
risk that the fee will be used to reward creditors that are in a position to extract 
private benefits. 
Courts’ treatment of breakup fees outside of bankruptcy provides useful in-
sight into how these benefits and costs can be incorporated into the analysis. 
Breakup fees are typically promised by a target corporation as compensation to 
the bidder if a proposed acquisition fails to go through, either because another 
bidder emerges or the shareholders of the target reject the acquisition.149 Out-
side of bankruptcy, courts generally allow breakup fees in merger transactions 
if the fee is no more than three to four percent of the overall value of the 
deal.150 Courts have not established a single set of guidelines for breakup fees 
in bankruptcy,151 but they generally have limited breakup fees to one to three 
 
148. Indeed, the dynamics of large-scale corporate reorganization have changed so much that a 
lively debate has emerged as to whether creditors’ committees should even be appointed in 
every case. See, e.g., Christopher S. Sontchi & Bruce Grohsgal, Should the Appointment of a 
Committee of Unsecured Creditors’ Committee Be Made Optional in Chapter 11?, 38 AM. BANKR. 
INST. J. 12 (2019). 
149. There is a robust scholarly literature on breakups and other forms of “lockups.” For lockups 
in corporate law, see, for example, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side 
Model of M&A Lockups: Theory and Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REV. 307 (2000). For lockups in 
bankruptcy, see, for example, Bruce A. Markell, The Case Against Breakup Fees in Bankruptcy, 
66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349 (1992). 
150. E.g., In re Answers Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 6170-VCN, 2012 WL 1253072, at *8 & n.50 
(Del. Ch. Apr. 11, 2012); In re Topps Co. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 86-87 (Del. Ch. 2007); 
see also David Fox, Breakup Fees—Picking Your Number, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERN-
ANCE (Sept. 11, 2012), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/09/11/breakup-fees-picking-
your-number [https://perma.cc/Z3PR-J3JA] (“[T]here is a significant amount of statistical 
data to back up a general proposition that fees ‘usually’ fall in the 3% to 4% range.”); cf. Bra-
zen v. Bell Atl. Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 49 n.17 (Del. 1997) (presenting Delaware case law on 
breakup fees). 
151. Three different standards for scrutinizing breakup fees have emerged in the bankruptcy 
courts. Under the most lenient test, the court assesses a debtor’s request to agree to a 
breakup fee under a business-judgment-rule standard. In re Integrated Res., Inc., 147 B.R. 
650, 657-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). A second group of courts considers the “best interest of the es-
tate.” In re Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 166 B.R. 908, 912-13 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994) (endorsing the 
perspective of Markell, supra note 149). Under the strictest approach, followed by courts in 
the Third Circuit, courts consider whether the breakup fee qualifies as an administrative ex-
pense, In re O’Brien Envtl. Energy, Inc., 181 F.3d 527, 532-33 (3d Cir. 1999)—that is, whether 
the fee was “necessary to preserve the value of the estate,” id. at 535. For further discussion, 
see generally Monica E. White, Note, Give Me a Break-Up Fee: In re Reliant Energy Chan-
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percent of the proposed purchase price.152 The best justification for permitting 
breakup fees, rather than disallowing them altogether, is that they compensate 
the bidder for its costs in the event the transaction collapses. At the same time, 
breakup fees provide modest protection for the deal favored by the target’s di-
rectors, who have agreed to permit a change-in-control transaction.153 
RSA fees loosely resemble breakup fees, but there are several important 
differences between the two: although RSAs sometimes include breakup fees 
(structured as a payment in the event the proposed reorganization plan is not 
confirmed), standard RSA fees are not compensation in the event the deal fails. 
The signatories of an RSA receive the fee when the RSA becomes the basis for a 
successful reorganization. RSA fees also directly affect the vote on a proposed 
reorganization plan, whereas the effect of a lockup on voting is indirect. Fur-
ther, RSA fees are designed to address different concerns than breakup fees, 
such as the risk of holdouts. 
Despite these distinctions, the cost to the signatories is nevertheless an ap-
propriate initial yardstick for assessing RSA fees, as with lockups. As noted ear-
lier, the parties who negotiate an RSA are in a sense providing a public good for 
other creditors.154 The signatories may incur two other kinds of costs as well. 
They may be precluded from buying or selling claims during periods of active 
negotiation, and any purchasers of their existing claims may be constrained by 
the terms of the RSA. The signatories also waive their right to object subse-
quently to a reorganization plan that conforms with the requirements of the 
RSA. It may be possible to quantify some of the costs of committing to the 
RSA—by tracking changes in the value of claims during the period of the nego-
tiations, for instance. But even if the less tangible costs cannot be quantified, 
 
nelview LP and the Third Circuit’s Improper Rejection of a Bankruptcy Bid Protection Provision, 
48 HOUS. L. REV. 659 (2011), which argues for the business-judgment-rule approach. 
152. See, e.g., AgriProcessors, Inc. v. Fokkena (In re Tama Beef Packing, Inc.), 321 B.R. 496, 498 
(B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2005) (noting that breakup fees are “usually limited to one to four percent 
of the purchase price”); In re Dura Auto. Sys., Inc., No. 06-11202 (KJC), 2007 WL 7728109, 
at *91 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 15, 2007) (noting that past breakup fees approved by the court 
have generally been between 2% and 3%); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 363.02[7] (16th ed. 
2019) (concluding that courts typically limit breakup fees to 3% of the deal value, although 
they “have approved higher amounts, up to about 5 percent of the consideration, in unusual 
circumstances”). 
153. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., A Reliance Damages Approach to Corporate Lockups, 90 NW. U. L. 
REV. 564, 574 (1996). For an argument that breakup fees should be more tightly con-
strained, see Coates & Subramanian, supra note 149, at 376-77. 
154. See supra text accompanying note 147. Note that this role is somewhat analogous to serving 
on a creditors’ committee. There, attorneys’ fees are paid but the creditors’ opportunity costs 
are not compensated. 
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they should be taken into account when a court determines whether and to 
what extent to approve an RSA fee. 
Other independent justifications can be analyzed in somewhat analogous 
terms. If a proposed reorganization plan includes a differential deathtrap that 
requires creditors who vote “yes” to agree to waive potential causes of action 
against third parties, for instance, the court should assess the value of the third-
party release. If the parties to an RSA agree to participate in a rights offering 
and commit to backstopping that offering (i.e., purchase any unsold shares), 
the court should consider the value of this backstopping benefit. 
A similar logic applies with independent justifications that do not directly 
benefit the debtor. The signatories to the PREPA RSA, for instance, were 
promised interest payments that effectively functioned as a settlement of the 
signatory bondholders’ claim to postpetition interest. The threshold question 
here, as with waivers or rights offerings, is the reasonableness of the payments. 
If independent justifications are present, a signing fee or differential com-
pensation may be justified even if it makes the RSA or deathtrap marginally 
more coercive than the risk of holdout behavior appears to warrant. If a fee or 
compensation is greater than the benefit provided, however, or if its effect is 
highly coercive, it should not be permitted. 
D. Is the Holdout Risk Created by Contract? 
The discussion thus far has assumed that the parties’ contract does not 
purport to impose limitations on restructuring that are intended to apply in 
bankruptcy; these limitations may be in the form of provisions such as a su-
permajority voting rule or unanimity requirement. If the contract does impose 
such restrictions, a fourth rule of thumb comes into play: unless there is a good 
reason not to honor efforts to contract around the bankruptcy’s voting rules, 
courts should view distortive techniques more skeptically, even if the prospect 
of holdouts is high.155 
The logic for this rule of thumb, which may initially seem counterintuitive, 
comes from an important literature on contract renegotiation. In structuring an 
initial contract, the parties face a choice whether to make renegotiation easy or 
difficult. Renegotiation is more likely to succeed, for instance, if the contract 
 
155. For an argument that bankruptcy judges tend to be too hostile to ex ante contracts, see Da-
vid A. Skeel, Jr. & George Triantis, Bankruptcy’s Uneasy Shi� to a Contract Paradigm, 166 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1777, 1806, 1808-11 (2018). For a discussion of externalities as a legitimate con-
cern, see id. at 1811-12. 
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requires only a simple majority vote than if every creditor must agree.156 Each 
approach has key costs and benefits. While easily renegotiated contracts can be 
beneficial ex post, as they facilitate a restructuring if the debtor’s fortunes dete-
riorate, they may create suboptimal incentives ex ante. Renegotiation-proof 
contracts, by contrast, can interfere with a restructuring that makes sense ex 
post but may create better incentives ex ante. 
Although the voting rules in the Bankruptcy Code are mandatory, the debt-
or or its creditors occasionally attempt to alter them by contract.157 Loan syndi-
cates are a good illustration of how parties might attempt to contract around 
the voting rules. The terms of loan syndicates usually preclude renegotiation of 
the loan unless every lender agrees, or provide for other, carefully tailored in-
ternal voting arrangements.158 Because each participant has its own claim, syn-
dicates are subject to the ordinary Chapter 11 voting rules if the debtor files for 
bankruptcy.159 But a syndicate can also be structured as a single claim repre-
senting the entire syndicate, which would be voted in Chapter 11 pursuant to 
the syndicate’s voting rules. In my view, courts should honor such arrange-
ments absent clear evidence they impose externalities on other parties. At the 
very least, courts should be more skeptical of distortive techniques if the par-
ties’ contract reflects a decision to make renegotiation difficult.160 
Because efforts to contract around the bankruptcy voting rules are uncom-
mon, the fourth rule of thumb usually will not come into play in bankruptcy. 
But this may change. Further, this rule of thumb has important implications 
outside of bankruptcy, as discussed later.161 
 
156. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton & David S. Scharfstein, Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of 
Creditors, 104 J. POL. ECON. 1, 3 (1996) (arguing that borrowing from multiple creditors dis-
courages the borrower from defaulting and renegotiating). 
157. See, e.g., Bank of Am., Nat’l Ass’n v. N. LaSalle St. Ltd. P’ship (In re 203 N. LaSalle St. 
P’ship), 246 B.R. 325, 331-32 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000) (refusing to enforce the assignment of 
voting rights from junior to senior creditors). 
158. See, e.g., Amir Sufi, Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from Syndi-
cated Loans, 62 J. FIN. 629, 633 (2007) (finding that “unanimity of all syndicate members is 
always required to change terms related to principal, interest, maturity, or collateral,” where-
as other terms are subject to different voting rules). 
159. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2018) (defining the acceptance of a plan by a class as two thirds in 
amount and a majority in number voting yes). 
160. Another, more complicated, example is bond indentures. Most corporate bond indentures 
prohibit the restructuring of a bondholder’s principal without her consent. This restriction, 
which is imposed by the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-253, § 316, 53 Stat. 1149, 
1172-73 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp (2018)), was intended to apply outside of 
bankruptcy but not in bankruptcy. This provision is discussed in Sections IV.A, V.B. 
161. See infra Section V.B. 
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E. Should Creditors Be Permitted to Change Their Votes? 
A final consideration is whether courts should permit creditors to change 
their votes on a reorganization plan if confirmation has been facilitated by the 
new distortive techniques. The bankruptcy rules explicitly contemplate vote 
changes if a creditor can demonstrate “cause.”162 
Courts have interpreted the “cause” standard quite liberally where a credi-
tor wishes to change a vote that was cast by mistake, or where the reorganiza-
tion plan was modified a�er the vote.163 They also have allowed creditors to 
change a rejection to an acceptance a�er the debtor negotiated with the creditor 
to secure acceptance.164 But courts have refused to permit vote changes by cred-
itors seeking strategic advantage or where there appeared to be an improper 
motive.165 
The logic of these cases could easily be extended to the new distortive tech-
niques. If courts routinely permitted creditors to change votes that were subject 
to distortion, it could undermine the voting process. But in at least two con-
texts, vote changes may occasionally be appropriate. First, if the creditor would 
have been entitled to compensation had she signed an RSA or voted “yes,” and 
the RSA or deathtrap is significantly distortive, the court could allow the credi-
tor to change her vote and receive the extra compensation if the class votes to 
 
162. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3018(a) (“For cause shown, the court a�er notice and hearing may permit 
a creditor or equity security holder to change or withdraw an acceptance or rejection.”). 
163. See, e.g., In re Am. Solar King Corp., 90 B.R. 808, 826-27 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988) (approv-
ing a vote change because the plan was modified a�er the debtor had reached a settlement 
agreement with the creditor, and no one objected to the change at the relevant hearing). For 
a succinct overview of the case law, see Charles M. Oellermann & Mark G. Douglas, Voter’s 
Remorse: Taking Back an Acceptance or Rejection of a Chapter 11 Plan, JONES DAY PUBLICATIONS 
(Nov.-Dec. 2014), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2014/12/voters-remorse-taking-
back-an-acceptance-or-rejection-of-a-chapter-11-plan [https://perma.cc/22FK-N5BA]. 
164. In re Bourbon Saloon, Inc., No. 11-11518, 2012 WL 899282, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. La. Mar. 14, 
2012) (allowing a creditor to change its vote from rejection to acceptance a�er the debtor 
negotiated with the creditor in an effort to avoid cramdown). 
165. See, e.g., In re Mcorp Fin., Inc., 137 B.R. 237, 239 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992) (denying a motion 
to change a creditor’s vote because “the timing of the change [was] highly suspect”—the 
creditor sought to change his vote on the same day he reached a side agreement with the 
debtor, which was one day a�er the debtor realized changing the creditor’s vote would turn 
a rejecting class into an accepting class); cf. In re Epic Assocs. V, 62 B.R. 918, 924 (Bankr. 
E.D. Va. 1986) (ruling that “cause” for vote changing was established by “the brevity of the 
voting period, and the intricacy of the Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization and its 
supplements”). 
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accept the plan.166 The possibility that a creditor who opposed the plan could 
later change her vote would at least slightly reduce the consequences of voting 
“no.” 
A second context where a vote change may be appropriate is when a credi-
tor has voted “yes,” and her class has approved the plan, but the plan can only 
be approved by cramdown, because at least one other class has voted “no.”167 
The vote change would only benefit a creditor if enough claims in her class also 
elected to change their vote to shi� the vote of the class from “yes” to “no.” But 
where their vote would make a difference, a vote change would provide credi-
tors the protections given to objecting classes.168 
Vote changes should only be allowed sparingly. But they are a potentially 
useful escape valve in cases where the court did not invalidate a significantly 
distortive RSA or deathtrap. 
iv.  applying the framework: four case studies  
In this Part, I turn to the practical task of showing how the rules of thumb 
might be applied in a particular case. I focus on four widely discussed recent 
cases. Each involves a distinctive and creative, but not patently pernicious, use 
of the distortive techniques. The rules-of-thumb analysis reveals that distortive 
techniques were permissible in PREPA and Momentive, borderline in Arch Coal, 
and should have been prohibited in Peabody. 
A. PREPA: A Complex RSA169 
The restructuring of Puerto Rico’s electricity company, PREPA, has fea-
tured two different RSAs, one negotiated (but not finalized) before and the 
other a�er the enactment of legislation giving Puerto Rico and its public corpo-
 
166. If the benefit would not have been available to the creditor—as, for instance, with an RSA 
fee that was offered only to creditors that negotiated a plan that the creditor had no in-
volvement in—the vote change should not be permitted. 
167. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (2018) (providing that a reorganization plan can be confirmed 
consensually only if every class votes “yes”). 
168. Two key cramdown protections for an objecting class are the prohibition against “unfair dis-
crimination” and the requirement that the absolute-priority rule be satisfied with respect to 
the class. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2018). These protections are not available for a class that ap-
proves the plan. 
169. As disclosed at the outset of this Article, I am on the Puerto Rico Oversight Board that nego-
tiated and signed the PREPA RSA on behalf of PREPA, and I am actively involved in the 
case. 
the yale law journal 130:366  2020 
408 
rations access to a Chapter 11-like restructuring option.170 Each RSA centered 
on PREPA’s largest group of creditors—bondholders who hold more than $8 
billion of the company’s $11 billion debt. The earlier RSA would have paid the 
bondholders 85% of their claims, but it was eventually rejected by the Over-
sight Board by a closely divided vote.171 
Over the next year—starting a�er the destruction inflicted by Hurricane 
Maria—the Oversight Board and an ad hoc group of PREPA bondholders reo-
pened negotiations. The negotiations culminated in a preliminary RSA on July 
30, 2018 and a definitive RSA on May 3, 2019.172 Assured Guaranty, a major in-
surer of PREPA bonds, joined the RSA during the months between the prelim-
inary and final agreements,173 and two other bond insurers (Syncora and Na-
tional) joined a�er the definitive agreement was signed.174 
Although the proposed PREPA RSA is quite intricate, its basic terms can be 
easily stated. Bondholders who joined the RSA would receive new bonds worth 
a maximum of 77.5% of their claims,175 as well as three additional benefits. 
First, the bondholders would be given a waiver and support fee of 1.62% of 
their claims, as accrued through May 1, 2019.176 Second, they would receive in-
terest payments at a rate of 5.25%, and these payments would vary based on 
 
170. The Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA)—the 
2016 Puerto Rico legislation—includes a set of restructuring provisions drawn from Chapter 
11 and from Chapter 9, which governs municipal bankruptcy. See Pub. L. No. 114-187, 
§§ 301-317, 130 Stat. 549, 577-85 (2016). The restructuring provisions are generally referred 
to as “Title III,” which is where they appear in PROMESA. 
171. See Andrew G. Biggs, Arthur J. Gonzalez, Ana J. Matosantos & David A. Skeel, Jr., Privatize 
Puerto Rico’s Power, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2017, 6:55 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles
/privatize-puerto-ricos-power-1498776904 [https://perma.cc/D8DD-JQJW]. 
172. Amendment No. 3 to Definitive Restructuring Agreement at 1-2, In re Fin. Oversight & 
Mgmt. Bd., No. 17-BK-04780-LTS (D.P.R. Sept. 9, 2019) [hereina�er Conformed Defini-
tive RSA]; Preliminary Restructuring Support Agreement, In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. 
Bd., No. 17-BK-04780-LTS (D.P.R. Sept. 9, 2019). 
173. Conformed Definitive RSA, supra note 172, at 1. 
174. Id at 2. Collectively, the bond insurers held roughly $2.3 billion of PREPA’s bonds as of Sep-
tember 9, 2019. See id. (listing the amounts held by Assured Guaranty, Syncora, and Na-
tional). 
175. Bondholders would receive two kinds of bonds, an “A bond” that pays 67.5% of their claims, 
and a “B bond” whose payout ranges from 0 to 10%, depending on the demand for electrici-
ty in the next forty-seven years. See Declaration of David Brownstein in Support of Joint 
Motion of Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority and AAFAF Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code 
Sections 362, 502, 922, and 928, and Bankruptcy Rules 3012(A)(1) and 9019 for Order Ap-
proving Settlements Embodied in the Restructuring Support Agreement at 13, In re Fin. 
Oversight & Mgmt. Bd., No. 17-BK-04780-LTS (D.P.R. Sept. 9, 2019). 
176. Id. at 28. 
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when the bondholder joined the RSA. A bondholder who joined the RSA by 
May 31, 2019 would receive interest payments starting as of May 1, 2019. For 
bondholders who joined a�er May 31, 2019 but by December 1, 2019, the com-
mencement date would be September 1, 2019. Those that joined a�er Decem-
ber 1, 2019 would not receive interest payments prior to confirmation of a re-
structuring plan.177 As a final inducement, signatories also would be 
reimbursed for the professional fees they incurred in negotiating the RSA, up 
to a maximum of $25 million.178 
To assess whether an RSA with these terms should be permitted, start with 
the first factor, holdouts. Holdouts appear to have been a major concern in the 
restructuring in two respects. The first is a familiar feature of many current 
cases, the effect of a vibrant market for distressed debt. The PREPA bonds were 
actively traded,179 which created the possibility that strategically minded trad-
ers would act as holdouts, perhaps threatening to block any deal that had been 
tentatively approved by the existing bondholders. The second holdout issue 
was distinctive to PREPA’s creditors. At least one of the bond insurers appeared 
to be in precarious financial condition. If true, the bond insurer had an incen-
tive to resist any significant write-down of its debt, even if a write-down were 
economically warranted.180 
Given the significant holdout concerns, at least some coercion—the second 
rule of thumb—could be justified. The principal question is whether the enti-
tlement or procedural coercion in the RSA was excessive.181 By itself, the mag-
 
177. See Conformed Definitive RSA, supra note 172, at 4 (defining “Administrative Claim Com-
mencement”). 
178. Id. at 47. 
179. Andrew Scurria, Puerto Rico Utility Deal Stumbles, Shaking Muni Investors, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 
2, 2020, 7:10 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/puerto-rico-utility-deal-stumbles-
shaking-muni-investors-11583194215 [https://perma.cc/YN8K-JAJ9] (describing “turnover 
among Prepa’s investors”). 
180. See, e.g., Rating Action: Moody’s Downgrades MBIA Inc. and National Public Finance Guarantee 
Corp. (IFS to Baa2); MBIA Insurance Corp. Affirmed at Caa1, MOODY’S INV. SERV. (Jan. 17, 
2018), https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-MBIA-Inc-and-National-
Public-Finance-Guarantee-Corp-PR_377693 [https://perma.cc/TE2Z-G6H7] (attributing 
the downgrade to “an increased probability of more severe losses resulting from National’s 
Puerto Rico exposures,” among other reasons). It is worth noting that all of the bond insur-
ers would have been paid in full under the original RSA. 
181. The creditors’ committee fiercely opposed approval of the RSA, contending that the RSA “is 
deeply flawed, and the Government Parties have provided no credible justification for the 
windfall it will provide to the Supporting Holders.” Official Committee of Unsecured Credi-
tors’ Objection to Joint Motion of Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority and AAFAF Pursu-
ant to Bankruptcy Code Sections 362, 502, 922 and 928 and Bankruptcy Rules 3012(a)(1) 
and 9019 for Order Approving Settlements Embodied in Restructuring Support Agreement 
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nitude of the waiver and support fee—1.62%—seems generous but within the 
acceptable range. The interest payments raise issues both of process and enti-
tlement. The payments would be quite substantial—more than double the 
amount of the waiver and support fee—and coercively structured, since first 
adopters begin receiving the payments earlier. The procedural coercion is sig-
nificantly mitigated by the fact that the preliminary RSA was signed nine 
months before the definitive RSA, giving bondholders ample time to decide 
whether to join. Given the amount of the overall fees, the entitlement coercion 
is a closer call. 
Turning to the third rule of thumb, there were at least three independent 
justifications for the terms of the RSA. First, the ad hoc group of bondholders 
provided a public good by negotiating the RSA and forgoing trading for ex-
tended periods of time, beginning from even before the Title III petition was 
filed on behalf of PREPA.182 These contributions suggest that a generous com-
pensation for costs would be appropriate. 
Second, in return for signing the RSA, bondholders relinquished the right 
to ask for the appointment of a receiver, which bondholders were entitled to 
request if 25% of the bondholders had joined the motion. The receiver’s task 
would be to collect what the bondholders were owed, which could easily derail 
the reorganization effort. The bond insurers had pursued litigation, asking the 
court to permit the receiver to be appointed. If several of the bond insurers 
joined the RSA and withdrew from the receiver action, fewer than 25% of the 
bondholders needed would support the motion, and the receivership threat 
would be averted. 
Third, the interest payments settled the bondholders’ contested claim that 
they were secured creditors who were entitled to interest payments on the full 
amount of their claims for the duration of the restructuring case. Under the 
RSA, the bondholders would receive interest, but the payments would begin 
more than a year a�er the petition was filed, and the payments would be based 
on the amount of their restructured claim, not their full claim. Given that the 
RSA fees were on the borderline of being permissible even apart from inde-
pendent justifications, and there were substantial independent justifications, 
the RSA seems clearly permissible. 
The fourth rule of thumb—the parties’ contracts—adds an important wrin-
kle but does not alter this conclusion. The PREPA bond contracts include a so-
 
at 10, In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd., 361 F. Supp. 3d 203 (D.P.R. 2019) (No. 17-BK-
3283). 
182. Because $25 million of their attorneys’ fees were compensated separately, the incremental 
value of the public good provided is somewhat less than would otherwise be the case. See 
supra text accompanying note 178. 
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called unanimity clause—a provision stating that the principal or interest of a 
bond cannot be altered unless the individual bondholder consents.183 Outside 
of bankruptcy, no bondholder could be bound by a vote of other bondholders 
to restructure the bonds. If this provision reflected a conscious decision by the 
parties to make the bonds difficult to restructure in bankruptcy, it would call 
for much more stringent scrutiny of efforts to discipline holdouts. There is 
good reason to believe it did not, however. The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 re-
quires that this provision be included in corporate bonds but intends for bond 
restructurings to take place in bankruptcy, under bankruptcy’s majority voting 
rules.184 With ordinary corporate bonds, the unanimity requirement is dictated 
by law and is intended to be overridden in bankruptcy.185 
There is one final twist. Unlike private entities, public issuers such as 
PREPA are not subject to the Trust Indenture Act.186 If the inclusion of the 
unanimity requirement reflected a conscious decision to discourage renegotia-
tion, a court would need to take this into consideration. But the inclusion of a 
unanimity requirement may simply reflect a mimicking of the handling of cor-
porate debt.187 Even if it were more intentional, the same logic would have ap-
plied with PREPA debt as with ordinary corporate debt: the debt would be 
subject to the unanimity requirement outside of bankruptcy, but it could be re-
structured under the bankruptcy voting provisions if PREPA filed for (munici-
pal) bankruptcy.188 
The unanimity provision does not alter the earlier conclusion that the 
PREPA RSA fees are substantial but justifiable. Although the entitlement coer-
 
183. Section 1102 of the Trust Agreement, under which PREPA issued bonds, permits most 
amendments if 60% of the bonds agree, but excludes any “extension of the maturity of the 
principal of or the in[t]erest on any bond” or “a reduction in the principal amount of any 
bond.” Trust Agreement, Puerto Rico Water Resources Authority to First National City Bank, 
Trustee, § 1102, at 88-89 (Jan. 1, 1974). 
184. See, e.g., Bratton & Levitin, supra note 31, at 1600. 
185. See infra notes 243-244 and accompanying text. 
186. See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51 EMORY 
L.J. 1317, 1329-30 (2002). 
187. See, e.g., id. (noting this possibility). 
188. Puerto Rico had access to municipal bankruptcy when the PREPA indenture was put in 
place, and thus could have permitted PREPA to file for bankruptcy if needed, but it lost ac-
cess to municipal bankruptcy when Congress adopted a new definition of “state” in 1984. 
For the history, see Stephen J. Lubben, Puerto Rico and the Bankruptcy Clause, 88 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 553, 573-78 (2014). PROMESA created a new bankruptcy-like option in 2016. See Puerto 
Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, Pub. L. No. 114-187, §§ 301-317, 
130 Stat. 549, 577-85 (2016). 
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cion is significant, the high risk of holdout behavior and the presence of sub-
stantial independent justifications suggest that the fees should be permitted. 
B. Momentive: A Complex Deathtrap 
As discussed earlier, Momentive’s deathtrap gave its senior (First and 1.5 
Lien Noteholder) creditors a choice. They could either accept the plan, which 
promised payment in cash in full but required the creditors to waive a $200 
million make-whole claim. Or they could reject the plan, assert their make-
whole claim, and receive replacement notes plus the cramdown rate of inter-
est.189 To the extent this provision was intended to nudge the senior creditors 
into accepting the plan, it didn’t work. The senior creditors rejected the plan, 
choosing to litigate their case for the make-whole claim. 
Although it is not clear how actively Momentive’s debt was traded, the case 
was hotly contested throughout, and the principal creditors were distressed-
debt investors who posed a significant risk of holdout.190 The senior and junior 
creditors had an elaborate contract—which became a major source of litigation 
in the case—but the contract did not alter the voting rights each class of credi-
tor had within its class.191 The first rule of thumb thus suggests that the use of 
distortive techniques was warranted, and the fourth—the parties’ contracts—
does not alter this conclusion. 
Turning to the second rule of thumb, coercion, there does not appear to 
have been procedural coercion. The distortion occurred in the Chapter 11 vote 
itself, and the vote was not rushed or otherwise irregular. Although the poten-
tial silencing of the junior creditors was hotly contested,192 the court ultimately 
concluded that the deathtrap did not silence any constituency. 
The key question is whether the entitlement coercion was excessive. The 
first point to note is that the senior creditors’ rejection of the plan does not ne-
gate the possibility the deathtrap was too coercive. The deathtrap le� the senior 
 
189. See supra Section I.B. 
190. Cf. Nick Brown, Momentive’s $570 Mln Bankruptcy Loan Package Approved by Judge, REUTERS 
(May 23, 2014, 1:05 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/momentive-bankruptcy
/momentives-570-mln-bankruptcy-loan-package-approved-by-judge-
idUSL1N0O913C20140523 [https://perma.cc/XCE7-E6BA] (mentioning the involvement of 
Aurelius Capital Management and Apollo Global Management LLC). For discussion of the 
principal disputes in the case, see Kenneth Ayotte, Anthony J. Casey & David A. Skeel, Jr., 
Bankruptcy on the Side, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 255, 268-69 (2017). 
191. Ayotte, Casey & Skeel, supra note 190, at 295-97 (describing voting in the case). 
192. Id. at 269 (describing the court’s conclusion that the intercreditor agreement did not pre-
clude the junior creditors from objecting). 
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creditors with a difficult decision of choosing between accepting a full payout 
on a smaller claim, and continuing to insist on receiving an additional make-
whole claim but facing the risk of receiving a below-market interest rate on 
their claim. Indeed, if the senior creditors were clairvoyant, they would have 
known they should not reject the plan, since their make-whole claim would ul-
timately be disallowed.193 
To assess the deathtrap’s coerciveness, we need to consider two uncertain-
ties in the rejection payout. A deathtrap based on the first uncertainty—the va-
lidity of the make-whole claim—does not seem problematic. Suppose that the 
plan offered the senior creditors $100 in cash—the amount of their claim—but 
no make-whole claim if they accepted, and $75 in cash and the right to litigate a 
$50 make-whole claim if they rejected the plan. This deathtrap postpones po-
tentially time-consuming make-whole litigation until a�er confirmation of a 
plan, thus enabling an earlier confirmation, and it may reflect the debtor’s legit-
imately lower assessment of the likelihood that the senior creditors will suc-
ceed. Any coercive effect seems limited and justified by the risk of holdouts. 
In Momentive itself, there was a second uncertainty—the possibility the sen-
ior creditors would be given a below-market interest rate on their claim. To il-
lustrate the effects of this uncertainty, suppose the debtor proposes to give the 
senior creditors $75 not in cash but in a promissory note bearing a below-
market interest rate; this depressed rate makes the note worth less than $75. 
The threat of a below-market interest rate increases the debtor’s leverage in the 
restructuring process. But it is not a tool of the debtor’s own devising. The pos-
sibility of a below-market interest rate is the legacy of a problematic Supreme 
Court decision.194 Even without considering the third rule of thumb, inde-
pendent justifications,195 the deathtrap was therefore defensible. On the fourth 
rule of thumb, the parties’ intercreditor agreement did not include voting rules 
purporting to alter the bankruptcy voting rules.196 
Although the bankruptcy judge felt compelled to confirm a below-market 
interest rate, the Second Circuit reversed on this one point, instructing the 
 
193. Absent clairvoyance, whether the provision was coercive would depend in part on the senior 
creditors’ ex ante probability of success on their make-whole claim. 
194. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004). Criticism of Till is widespread. See, e.g., An-
thony J. Casey, Bankruptcy’s Endowment Effect, 33 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 141, 143-45 (2016). 
195. The principal independent justification was postponing the make-whole litigation until a�er 
confirmation. Its significance was limited, given that the debtor could have attained this 
benefit without using a deathtrap. 
196. Second Lien Intercreditor Agreement, In re MPM Silicones, L.L.C., No. 14-22503-rdd 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014), 2014 WL 4436335. 
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bankruptcy court to take the market rate into account.197 If this ruling is gener-
ally followed, it will remove debtor’s ability to wield the prospect of a below-
market interest rate over creditors. That was the dominant source of coercion 
in Momentive, not the deathtrap provision, which was simply an elaborate ver-
sion of the generally permissible traditional deathtrap. 
C. Coal Company RSAs and Deathtraps 
Since 2010, most of the largest coal-mining companies in the United States, 
including Peabody, Arch Coal, and Patriot, have gone through Chapter 11 at 
least once. The reorganizations have been controversial because the companies 
have shed both environmental and pension obligations in their bankruptcy cas-
es.198 Perhaps not surprisingly, the coal companies have been quite aggressive 
in their use of the new distortive techniques. The discussion that follows con-
siders both Arch Coal and Peabody. 
1. Arch Coal 
Arch Coal, which filed for bankruptcy in early 2016, initially proposed a re-
organization plan with a deathtrap. The deathtrap would have reinstated ade-
quate-protection claims that the senior creditors had waived if the unsecured 
creditors’ committee (Committee) obtained standing to pursue litigation, if the 
Committee objected to the plan, or if the unsecured creditors voted against the 
plan.199 The Committee strenuously objected to this treatment. 
By its structure, the deathtrap thus appeared to effect both procedural and 
entitlement coercion. It sought to silence the principal representative of general 
creditors—the Committee—and threatened to deplete the assets that would 
otherwise be available to unsecured creditors if they voted against the plan. 
The final version of Arch Coal’s plan included a different deathtrap provi-
sion. If the class of unsecured-funded-debt claims voted “yes,”200 the allowed-
 
197. In the Matter of MPM Silicones, L.L.C, 874 F.3d 787, 799-801 (2d Cir. 2017). The Second 
Circuit held that Till did not preclude consideration of market interest where there is a clear 
market for the type of loan in question. 
198. See Joshua Macey & Jackson Salovaara, Bankruptcy as Bailout: Coal Company Insolvency and 
the Erosion of Federal Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 879, 882-85 (2019). 
199. Secured creditors can seek adequate protection to ensure that the collateral securing their 
debt is sufficient for the value of their claims. 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362(d)(1) (2018). 
200. The class of unsecured-funded-debt claims included both the allowed-notes claims and the 
first-lien deficiency claim. See Debtors’ Third Amended Plan of Reorganization at 46-47, In 
re Arch Coal, Inc., No. 16-40120-705 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Jan. 11, 2016), ECF No. 1091. 
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notes claims would receive a pro rata share of an eventual distribution.201 If the 
class of unsecured-funded-debt claims voted “no,” a holder of an allowed-notes 
claim would receive a pro rata share of the eventual distribution202 only if it ei-
ther voted “yes” or did not vote and agreed to a release of third-party claims.203 
The effect of the deathtrap was to treat holders of allowed-notes claims 
who voted “yes” and agreed to release the third-party claims differently from 
those who did not, in the event the class of unsecured-funded-debt claims as a 
whole voted “no.” A holder of an allowed-notes claim who voted “no” would 
receive a lower payout than others in its class if the plan was confirmed. 
Here, the potential threat of holdouts appears to have been significant, 
since the allowed-notes claims were actively traded. The first rule of thumb 
therefore suggests that the use of a distortive technique may be appropriate. 
Although procedural coercion was not present—the voting process was not 
rushed or irregular—the deathtrap imposed entitlement coercion that was 
analogous to a structurally coercive tender offer in corporate law.204 
The holders of allowed-notes claims were not as vulnerable as shareholders 
faced with a coercive two-tier tender offer in corporate law, given their greater 
ability to coordinate. And holders who agreed to the third-party releases were 
providing an independent benefit by waiving their right to pursue third-party 
claims. The deathtrap may therefore have been justifiable, but it appears to 
have been right on the margin between legitimate and problematic.205 Given 
this close call, it would have been appropriate for a bankruptcy court to allow a 
creditor that voted “no” to change its vote a�er the fact and to receive the high-
er recovery. But the deathtrap was not coercive enough to warrant striking it 
down. 
 
201. The first-lien deficiency claim was excluded from the distribution described in the text. Id. at 
30-31. 
202. Id. 
203. Allowed-notes claim holders could agree to release third-party claims either by signing the 
RSA, which committed signatories to the release, or by not opting out of the releases. 
204. For discussion of structurally coercive tender offers, see supra note 136 and accompanying 
text. 
205. The value of the differential compensation, and thus the magnitude of the coercion, cannot 
be determined from the record in the case. In its liquidation analysis for the case, the debtor 
estimated the total recovery for “unsecured debt instrument claims” to be very low, 1.2% to 
2.9%. Debtors’ Third Amended Plan of Reorganization, supra note 200, App’x B, at B-5.  
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2. Peabody Energy 
When Peabody Energy filed for bankruptcy in 2016, it had several major 
groups of secured creditors and one major unsecured class: $2.85 billion of first 
liens; $1 billion of second-lien secured notes; and $4.5 billion of unsecured sen-
ior notes and subordinated debentures.206 Even before bankruptcy, the unse-
cured-note and debenture holders had challenged the scope of the secured 
creditors’ liens. A�er filing for bankruptcy, Peabody sided with the unsecured 
creditors and objected to the scope of the liens. The bankruptcy court sent the 
contending parties into mediation. Creditors that wished to participate would 
be required to refrain from trading during the mediation. A creditor that did 
not participate initially could subsequently petition to be included, subject to 
the same no-trading condition. 
The mediation participants used the process not just to resolve the lien dis-
pute, but to create a framework for the overall reorganization. The centerpiece 
of the framework was a two-part financing arrangement that would raise $1.5 
billion of exit financing for Peabody,207 while also providing attractive benefits 
for the creditors involved. The first part would raise $750 million through a 
rights offering of new common stock. Select creditors could participate and 
purchase new common stock at a 45% discount to the expected value of the 
stock.208 
The second part, a private placement of $750 million of new preferred stock 
at a 35% discount, created far more controversy.209 The private placement had 
three tranches: 
 
206. For a nice summary of these and other features of the case, as well as the issues that Peabody 
raises, see John J. Rapisardi & Joseph Zujkowski, Chapter 11 Plan Support Agreements: Greas-
ing the Wheels for Confirmation Success, LAW.COM (Nov. 15, 2019, 11:45 AM), 
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/11/15/chapter-11-plan-support-agreements
-greasing-the-wheels-for-confirmation-success [https://perma.cc/342M-SWP9]. See also In 
re Peabody Energy Corp., 582 B.R. 771, 775 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2017), aff ’d, 933 F.3d 918 (8th 
Cir. 2019) (“The Debtors filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on April 13, 2016. At that time, the 
coal industry was continuing to experience a decline, and the Debtors had approximately 
$8.8 billion in outstanding principal long-term debt. Approximately $4.3 billion of this debt 
was secured by collateral that included real property at the Debtors’ larger coal mines. An-
other $3.7 billion of this debt was senior unsecured debt, with the remaining amounts repre-
sented by convertible junior subordinated debentures.”). 
207. Exit financing is funding that a reorganized debtor can use a�er it emerges from bankruptcy. 
208. In re Peabody Energy Corp., 933 F.3d 918, 922 (8th Cir. 2019). 
209. In a private placement, shares are sold only to preselected investors. 
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1. 22.5% of the placement was made available only to seven second-lien 
holders and noteholders that had been principal architects of the 
proposed plan; 
2. 5% was available to any creditor, but creditors were given fewer than 
three days to provide the required documentation; 
3. 72% was available to any creditor, subject to supplying the required 
documentation in roughly 30 days.210 
The core documentation obligation was joining the parties’ PSA.211 Under 
the PSA, the second-lien holders would receive 52% of their claims and the un-
secured creditors 22%.212 Signatories were required to vote in favor of the plan, 
forgo any objections to the plan, agree to a sizeable breakup fee if the PSA was 
not honored, and agree to backstop the rights offering and private placement in 
return for a fee.213 Backstopping the rights offering would require creditors to 
purchase all unclaimed shares, guaranteeing that the debtor would raise $750 
million. 
An ad hoc group of second liens and noteholders who had not joined the 
mediation challenged the private placement.214 “That a heist of the sort 
planned here has not been attempted in recent memory should not be surpris-
ing,” they complained.215 The ad hoc objectors insisted that the private place-
ment’s fees violated the requirement that all the members of a class of creditors 
be treated the same. The ad hoc group also offered to sponsor a $1.75 billion 
rights offering without any discount to the expected value of the stock, and to 
serve as backstop for the offering. The bankruptcy court, district court, and 
Eighth Circuit all rejected these arguments and upheld the reorganization plan. 
 
210. In re Peabody, 933 F.3d at 922-23. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. at 923. 
213. Id. at 922-923. 
214. The creditors’ committee initially opposed the proposed plan and rights offering but 
dropped its objection when the proponents agreed to set aside $60 million for general unse-
cured claims. Brief for Appellee Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Peabody En-
ergy Corp. at 3, 6, In re Peabody Energy Corp., 933 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-1302). 
A�er the objectors offered an alternative financing transaction, the creditors’ committee ne-
gotiated for an additional $15 million in return for a commitment not to withdraw its sup-
port. Id. at 7. 
215. Objection of Ad Hoc Committee of Non-Consenting Creditors to Confirmation of Debtors’ 
Chapter 11 Plan at 3, In re Peabody Energy Corp., 582 B.R. 771 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2017) (No. 
16-42529). 
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The Eighth Circuit signaled discomfort with the aggressiveness of the debtor’s 
arrangement, however. The court was right to express uneasiness, as we shall 
see. 
The first thing to note is that rights offerings and private placements spon-
sored by creditors are both controversial and increasingly common. One possi-
ble response would simply be to prohibit them, given the difficulty of deter-
mining whether they are fair. Banning these offerings would be defensible if it 
forced debtors to use alternative methods to nudge creditors to support a plan 
and compensate those who negotiated a plan. The principal cost would be los-
ing a potentially valuable source of financing for companies emerging from 
Chapter 11. 
If rights offerings and their ilk are not banned, how should the Peabody pri-
vate placement be assessed? The first rule of thumb, holdout risk, strongly fa-
vors permitting at least some distortive techniques. The case was heavily liti-
gated, there was significant trading of Peabody claims,216 and the risk of 
holdout behavior was significant throughout the case.217 
Turning to the rights offering—the parties’ response to the holdout risk—
each tranche raises concerns. The issue with the first tranche was not coercion, 
but rather that the payout possibly promised more to the seven creditors than 
their involvement in negotiations could justify—potentially amounting to a 
windfall. The inside creditors may have used their control of the process to ob-
tain private benefits. The second and third tranches created both procedural 
and entitlement coercion. Because the parties had only three days to decide 
whether to participate in the second tranche,218 they faced significant proce-
dural coercion. And because the compensation for participating in the second 
and third tranches—including the steep discount for the stock and the backstop 
fees—seems to have been above market, these tranches were quite coercive 
from an entitlement perspective. 
The procedural coercion seems to have been the one feature of the private 
placement that concerned the Eighth Circuit. “It is troubling,” the court wrote, 
 
216. See, e.g., Taylor Kuykendall, Peabody’s Bankruptcy Exit Painful Lesson in Distressed Firms for 
Some Investors, S&P GLOBAL MKT. INTELLIGENCE (May 3, 2017, 8:07 AM) 
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/trending/n1yauikkar-
jet7a3hy7ja2 [https://perma.cc/SUN9-J4TU]. 
217. The same factors that created significant holdout concerns also reduced the likelihood that 
the PSA would undermine the voting process by silencing potential objections to the reor-
ganization plan. For discussion of the risk that creditor agreements may silence potentially 
important objections, see Ayotte, Casey & Skeel, supra note 190, at 285-86; and Baird, supra 
note 16, at 617. 
218. In re Peabody, 933 F.3d at 923. 
distorted choice in corporate bankruptcy 
419 
“that creditors wishing to take part in the Private Placement had to elect to do 
so before approval of all the agreements and the disclosure statement.”219 The 
court nevertheless found independent justifications, concluding that the ar-
rangement was acceptable because “time was of the essence given the volatile 
nature of the coal market,” and “delay was likely to cost the Debtors around $30 
million per month in addition to other litigation costs.”220 
The Eighth Circuit showed little concern for the first tranche giving exclu-
sive rights to seven creditors and for the magnitude of its recoveries for credi-
tors that joined one or more of the three tranches; nor did the court consider 
the entitlement coercion this created. According to the court, the exclusivity of 
the first tranche was justified because “that sub-group took on more [back-
stopping] obligations” than other creditors in the same class.221 Further, the 
supra-competitive cost of the private placement was acceptable because “the 
Debtors might not have convinced the parties to the security-interest dispute to 
settle or commit to any number of the other agreements if the Debtors had not 
offered the preferred stock at a discount.”222 In effect, the court concluded that 
the rights offering was coercive and potentially problematic, but there were in-
dependent justifications for the distortive technique.223 
But if we focus more directly on the coercive features of the private place-
ment than the Eighth Circuit did, the court’s conclusions seem deeply prob-
lematic. Procedural coercion lends itself to relatively clear rules. Absent truly 
extraordinary circumstances (i.e., a highly compelling independent justifica-
tion), a three-day joinder period is simply too rushed, particularly because the 
creditors that did not participate in the mediation had only recently learned 
about the private placement. In this regard, it is worth comparing how the law 
treats tender-offer deadlines. Tender offers must be held open for at least twen-
ty days, under securities-law reforms and SEC regulations promulgated in re-
sponse to the structurally similar Saturday Night Specials of the 1960s.224 
The entitlement coercion is less straightforward. A significant problem 
with rights offerings is that they are hard to value, making it difficult to tell just 
how much they are compensating the parties for joining the PSA. The ad hoc 
 




223. Id. Although the Eighth Circuit did not emphasize this, the subgroup also bore the cost of 
forgoing the opportunity to trade while the mediation was ongoing. In re Peabody Energy 
Corp., 582 B.R. 771, 782 (E.D. Mo. 2017). 
224. See discussion supra notes 139-140 and accompanying text. 
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objectors claimed the compensation to signatories was $1.4 billion,225 but this 
and any other number is speculative. For a bankruptcy judge presumptively to 
prohibit rights offerings would seem quite justifiable and in keeping with 
courts’ treatment of potentially problematic provisions in the debtor-in-
possession financing realm.226 Alternatively, given the potential benefits of 
rights offerings,227 courts could police rights offerings much more carefully, for 
instance by requiring that they be made available to all creditors and subject to 
a market test.228 
Absent a presumption against rights offerings as part of a PSA, a court 
needs to determine whether the entitlement coercion is excessive, as well as the 
related question of whether plan proponents are receiving excessive compensa-
tion for the public good they have supplied. In this case, the answer to both 
questions appears to be yes. The rights offering was expected to be quite lucra-
tive, given the large discount from expected market values.229 The favored 
creditors’ exclusive access to the first tranche gave them an extremely high po-
tential recovery, and the discounted shares available in the other tranches creat-
ed significant pressure for nonparticipants in the mediation to sign the PSA. 
The presence of independent justifications, such as the need for a prompt 
reorganization and for exit financing, might warrant a somewhat more coercive 
PSA than would otherwise be the case. But the independent justifications were 
not so extraordinary as to justify the enormous benefits enjoyed by the plan 
proponents and other participating creditors.230 
 
225. The ad hoc objectors alleged that the initial 22.5% tranche alone would assure its seven re-
cipients a $103.5 million profit and that the overall profit on the private placement would be 
$1.4 billion. Objection of Ad Hoc Committee of Non-Consenting Creditors to Confirmation 
of Debtors’ Chapter 11 Plan, supra note 215, at 2-3. 
226. The bankruptcy judges in the Southern District of New York have guidelines requiring pro-
ponents of debtor-in-possession loans to flag explicitly, among other things, any provision 
using new collateral to collateralize prepetition obligations. See LOCAL BANKR. R. S.D.N.Y 
4001-2(a)(6). 
227. In a volatile industry such as oil and gas, for instance, there may be a significant benefit to 
lining up exit financing in advance. See Email from James Sprayregen, Partner, Kirkland & 
Ellis LLP, to author (Aug. 3, 2020, 6:05 PM EST) (on file with author).  
228. For a nice analysis of the Peabody case and a proposal for “reasonableness” scrutiny of rights 
offerings along these lines, see Shelby V. Saxon, Rights Offerings and Private Placements in 
Chapter 11: How Creditors Can Strike a Windfall Within the Boundaries of the Bankruptcy Code, 
AM. BANKR. L.J. (forthcoming 2020). 
229. Though rights offerings are typically difficult to value, the parties to the mediation in Pea-
body agreed on a value for the equity. In re Peabody Energy Corp., 582 B.R. 771, 776 n.5 
(E.D. Mo. 2017). 
230. Given the conclusion under the first three rules of thumb that the PSA with a rights offering 
should not have been permitted, it is unnecessary to consider whether the parties’ contracts 
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One response to the coercion might be to permit the objecting creditors to 
change their vote against the plan and to require that they be allowed to partic-
ipate in the rights offering. The procedural and entitlement coercion could be 
construed as “cause” for giving the objecting creditors an opportunity to revisit 
their earlier decision.231 
But this would not address the excessive compensation in the first tranche 
of the rights offering, which was available only to plan proponents, and the 
distortive techniques in Peabody were so egregious that they deserved a more 
aggressive rebuke. Peabody would have been a prime case for the court to refuse 
to approve the rights offering and signal that acutely coercive PSA terms will 
not be permitted, much as Delaware courts have done with extreme corporate 
lockups.232 By policing egregious uses of distortive techniques, bankruptcy 
courts could curb the parties’ temptation to overreach and thereby simplify 
their own task of discerning improperly coercive tactics. 
v. extensions 
Although the rules of thumb outlined in Part III were developed with bank-
ruptcy’s new distortive techniques in mind, the same logic can be applied in 
analogous contexts. In this Part, I extend the analysis to two issues that bear a 
strong familial relationship to the new distortive techniques: gi�ing in Chapter 
11 and coercive bond-exchange offers outside of bankruptcy. 
A. Gi�ing Transactions 
In a gi�ing transaction, one class of claims relinquishes a portion of its re-
covery and “donates” this portion to a class of equal or lower priority.233 In In re 
DBSD North America, for instance, the second-lien creditors purported to gi� a 
portion of their recovery to DBSD’s shareholder, which would receive stock and 
 
purported to limit restructuring. But there was no claim that the parties intended to limit re-
structuring through contract. 
231. See supra Section III.E. 
232. In Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court struck down an asset lockup that purported to 
commit to selling Revlon’s “crown jewels” to the favored bidder. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAn-
drews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184-85 (Del. 1986). In QVC, the court struck 
down a lockup of 20% of the target’s stock. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network, 
Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 39 (Del. 1994). 
233. See Michael Carnevale, Comment, Is Gi�ing Dead in Chapter 11 Reorganizations? Examining 
Absolute Priority in the Wake of the Second Circuit’s No-Gi� Rule in In re DBSD, 15 U. PA. J. 
BUS. L. 225, 230-31 (2012). 
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warrants in the reorganized debtor—despite Sprint holding unsecured claims 
in a higher-priority class, objecting to the plan, and not being paid in full.234 
Although DBSD receiving stock and warrants seemed to violate the absolute-
priority rule, the debtor argued that the shareholder’s recovery should not 
count for absolute-priority-rule purposes because it was a gi�, not a distribu-
tion from the estate.235 
Gi�ing differs from the other distortive techniques we have considered in 
two respects. First, although it can distort the voting process by circumventing 
the vote of an objecting class and by helping to secure a favorable vote from the 
class receiving the gi�, gi�ing is not directly linked to the vote. Second, gi�ing 
purports to be an intercreditor transfer, rather than a transfer from the debtor 
or the estate. But the effect of gi�ing is quite similar to those of the other dis-
tortive techniques, and securing a favorable vote is usually one of the objectives 
of a gi�ing transaction. Gi�ing also is sometimes used in combination with an 
RSA or deathtrap.236 
Courts have been far more hostile to gi�ing than to the other distortive 
techniques. Although gi�ing is sometimes permitted,237 the Second and Third 
Circuits have largely banned the practice. In In re DBSD North America, for in-
stance, the Second Circuit held that the purported gi� violated the absolute-
priority rule and refused to confirm the proposed plan.238 
The analysis of this Article helps explain why courts have been so skeptical 
of gi�ing transactions. In effect, the gi�ing arrangement is like infinite coer-
cion of the intervening class—the class is forced to agree to the transaction, 
even if the members of the class vote to reject the plan. Moreover, unlike with 
 
234. Dish Network Corp. v. DBSD N. Am., Inc. (In re DBSD N. Am., Inc.), 634 F.3d 79, 93-94 
(2d Cir. 2011). 
235. The Second Circuit ultimately rejected this argument. Id. at 98-101. 
236. See, e.g., Kevin J. Walsh, Uncertain Times: Recent Bankruptcy Case Law Leaves Parties Unsure 
and Possibly Searching for Alternatives, ASPATORE, Dec. 2011, at *4, 2011 WL 6471012 (suggest-
ing that deathtraps can be used to encourage acceptance of a plan that includes a gi�). Inter-
estingly, a�er the bankruptcy court rejected a deathtrap in the early case In re MCorp Fin., 
Inc., 137 B.R. 219, 236 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992), the district court later confirmed a plan that 
included a gi�. In re MCorp Fin., Inc., 160 B.R. 941, 960 (S.D. Tex. 1993). 
237. E.g., Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. v. Stern (In re SPM Mfg. Corp.), 984 F.2d 1305, 
1311-15 (1st Cir. 1993). 
238. 634 F.3d at 98-101; see also In re Armstrong World Indus., 432 F.3d 507, 514 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(providing another example of a court finding that a gi�ing scheme violated the absolute-
priority rule). In In re DBSD, the Second Circuit distinguished the case from In re SPM 
Manufacturing Corp. in two respects—first pointing out that it was a Chapter 7 case, so the 
absolute-priority rule did not explicitly apply, and second that the property in question be-
longed to the secured creditor because the stay had been li�ed. In re DBSD, 634 F.3d at 98. 
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RSA fees, the beneficiary of the gi� generally does not provide any additional 
benefit to the estate that justifies the compensation it receives.239 
This does not mean that gi�ing should never be permitted. In the face of a 
severe holdout problem, gi�ing may sometimes be appropriate. This is the 
most plausible defense of a gi�ing transaction in Detroit’s municipal bankrupt-
cy, for instance, where a class of unlimited tax bonds purported to gi� a por-
tion of their recovery to Detroit’s pension beneficiaries.240 The gi� weakened 
the potential unfair-discrimination objections of two monoline insurers that 
had held out for much of the case.241 Even here, the gi� was somewhat ques-
tionable, because the insurers’ holdout does not appear to have been simply 
strategic.242 But a court might plausibly conclude the gi� was defensible. Ab-
sent a very serious holdout issue, gi�s should not be permitted. Courts’ ten-
dency to view them much more skeptically than RSAs or deathtrap provisions 
is thus entirely justified. 
B. Coercive Bond Exchanges 
Under section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, a corporate bond 
cannot include a provision that facilitates a vote to restructure the bonds out-
side of bankruptcy if the company falls into financial distress.243 Each bond-
holder must be permitted to decide for herself whether to accept any proposal 
to “impair” the payment terms of the bonds. According to William Douglas, 
the leading New Deal proponent of section 316(b), the objective was to ensure 
that troubled companies with significant bond debt would restructure in bank-
ruptcy rather than outside of bankruptcy.244 In bankruptcy, the restructuring 
would take place under the watchful eye of a bankruptcy judge. 
Faced with this stricture, companies that wish to restructure their bonds 
outside of bankruptcy make exchange offers, where the company asks bond-
holders to accept a restructured bond in place of their current bond. The strat-
 
239. “The ‘gi�’ . . . may not be made to obtain valuable services going forward, but rather to en-
sure that the reorganization takes the shape that the senior creditor wants.” BARRY E. ADLER, 
ANTHONY J. CASEY & EDWARD R. MORRISON, BAIRD & JACKSON’S BANKRUPTCY: CASES, 
PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS 881 (5th ed. 2020). 
240. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 187-90 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014). 
241. See id. at 257-58. 
242. It is also unclear whether all of the unlimited tax bondholders were even aware that giving a 
portion of their recovery to the pensioners could be treated as a gi�. 
243. 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (2018). 
244. The legislative history of section 316(b) is discussed in DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMIN-
ION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 121-22 (2001). 
the yale law journal 130:366  2020 
424 
egy works only if a high percentage of bondholders—o�en 90%—agree to the 
exchange, since nonconsenting bondholders need to be paid in full.245 To 
nudge bondholders to accept, the exchanges o�en include an element of coer-
cion. The company may ask consenting bondholders to vote to alter the terms 
of the old bonds in an undesirable way, for instance, without expressly impair-
ing the bonds’ payment terms.246 
In Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Finance 
Corp.,247 the debtor took this strategy to the extreme. Under the terms of the 
exchange, the assets of Education Management Corporation (EDMC) would 
be sold in a foreclosure to a newly created subsidiary of EDMC. Consenting 
bondholders would receive restructured bonds with claims against the new 
subsidiary. The payment rights of nonconsenting bondholders would not be 
explicitly altered, but they would be le� with a claim against a company that no 
longer had any assets—an empty shell.248 A divided panel of the Second Circuit 
upheld the transaction. According to the majority, section 316(b) was intended 
only to prohibit amendments to payment terms, not to forbid restructurings 
done through foreclosure.249 So long as the payment terms are not altered, the 
court concluded, the exchange should be permitted.250 
The first thing to note is that the fourth rule of thumb—the nature of the 
parties’ contracts—is especially important for assessing bond-exchange offers. 
Unlike Chapter 11, which nudges the parties toward a restructuring, section 
316(b) was intended to discourage out-of-court restructuring and channel the 
debtor into bankruptcy. Courts’ willingness to permit coercive bond exchanges 
appears to be colored by their doubts about the wisdom of this baseline—
reservations that are widely shared by commentators.251 
The “impairment” language in section 316(b) can be seen as a proxy for 
this Article’s second rule of thumb—the degree of coercion, especially entitle-
ment coercion. If construed broadly, the language would suggest that the debt-
or cannot pressure a bondholder to accept a restructuring in any way—
completely forbidding entitlement coercion. It would not be difficult to strictly 
 
245. See John C. Coffee, Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of Constrained 
Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1207, 1214-15 (1991). 
246. See Bratton & Levitin, supra note 31, at 1608-11. 
247. 846 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 2017). 
248. Id. at 4. 
249. Id. at 10. 
250. Id. at 17. 
251. The classic early article is Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 
232, 277-79 (1987). 
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enforce section 316(b)’s no-impairment rule, and the results would not be as 
dire as sometimes feared. Given the ease of effecting a prepackaged bankruptcy, 
many of the firms that conduct bond exchanges could achieve the same benefits 
nearly as quickly in bankruptcy.252 
If a more flexible interpretation of “impairment” is inevitable, the first rule 
of thumb, holdouts, becomes far more important. Marblegate responded to the 
holdout problem in that case, but it did so with a reading of section 316(b) that 
could eviscerate any limits on coercion unless reined in by subsequent courts. A 
better solution would be to define “impairment” strictly, but to exclude cases 
where there is a severe holdout problem.253 Marblegate was just such a case. If 
EDMC failed to restructure and was forced to file for bankruptcy, it would lose 
the federal funding that was essential to its business. A single large holdout 
creditor—Marblegate—refused to agree to the restructuring, implicitly threat-
ening to destroy the company unless it received a special payout. Under these 
highly unusual circumstances, extreme entitlement coercion was justified.254 
Notice that the same rules of thumb we used to analyze bankruptcy’s new 
distortive techniques also can be used with gi�ing and bond-exchange offers. 
Granted, the analysis develops quite differently, given the different contexts. 
With both gi�ing and bond-exchange offers, a strong presumption against 
permitting the strategies is warranted. 
 
252. Bratton and Levitin suggest that secured-creditor control makes bankruptcy an unpromising 
alternative. Bratton & Levitin, supra note 31, at 1642-45. This does not seem likely to be a se-
rious obstacle where secured creditors will be fully protected, as they are in most prepack-
aged bankruptcies. It is more of an issue with companies that are not readily amenable to a 
prepackaged bankruptcy. 
253. A similar result could be achieved by coupling Marblegate’s lax reading of impairment with a 
good-faith obligation, as some scholars have advocated. See id. at 1673; see also DAVID CHRIS-
TOPH EHMKE, BOND DEBT GOVERNANCE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENT SOLUTIONS 
TO FINANCIAL DISTRESS OF CORPORATE BOND DEBTORS 238 (2018) (“[O]ne can reasonabl[y] 
read sec 316(b) TIA in a way that . . . does not protect holdouts from being exposed to a 
higher risk level once the exit consent is completed.”). 
254. In doctrinal terms, a court might conclude Marblegate’s payment rights were not truly im-
paired because the company would fail absent the exchange, and bondholders would receive 
little or nothing in bankruptcy. This is similar to the approach used by the Supreme Court in 
the Contracts Clause context. See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 
502, 513-16 (1942) (holding that restructuring of municipal bonds did not violate the Con-
tracts Clause because it made bondholders better off in the context of a financial crisis). 
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conclusion 
The new distortive techniques appear unseemly, o�en moving the Chapter 
11 voting process far away from the ideal of voting only on the merits. The 
simplest and initially most appealing response would be to ban them. 
Yet a strong antidistortion rule turns out to be undesirable once the struc-
ture of Chapter 11 and the nature of current Chapter 11 practice are taken into 
account. Some distortive techniques, such as a traditional deathtrap, are fully 
consistent with Chapter 11. Others are needed to counteract the instability of 
creditors in current cases and the significantly heightened risk of holdouts. 
Even seemingly problematic features of the new distortive techniques o�en 
prove justifiable in context. 
These factors suggest that the new distortive techniques should be policed 
rather than banned. In this Article, I have attempted to provide insights into 
how this might be done by offering rules of thumb to guide the analysis. 
